Donald Trump’s return to the White House has disrupted expectations around US–Taiwan ties. Once viewed as a stabilising force in cross-strait tensions, the relationship now faces uncertainty due to Trump’s unpredictable trade measures, mixed security messaging, and abrasive diplomacy. Although formal commitments stand, Washington’s altered tone and tactics have unsettled Taipei, injecting fresh ambiguity into a key Indo-Pacific partnership.
KEONI EVERINGTON, TAIPEI, TAIWAN
TAIWAN & CHINA CORRESPONDENT, NEWS ANALYTICS
a 5 mins read.
Since the US switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act has defined the unofficial relationship. Under it, Washington pledges to provide Taiwan with defensive arms and maintain the capacity to resist coercion, but without guaranteeing intervention. This deliberate ambiguity has allowed successive US administrations to support Taiwan while managing ties with China.
Taiwan’s position has grown increasingly vital as it has evolved into a global technology hub and a linchpin in semiconductor production. Its democracy and critical role in global supply chains make it a strategic partner for Washington, especially as China under Xi Jinping ramps up military and economic pressure on the country.
By late 2024, when Trump reclaimed the presidency, the US–Taiwan relationship was stable but faced new challenges. Taipei had deepened defence cooperation and expanded chip investment in the US, while Beijing had stepped up grey-zone military activities around the country. Many in Taiwan hoped Trump’s tough stance on China would translate into firmer US backing. What they encountered instead was unpredictability.
TRADE AND TARIFF SHOCKS
One of the earliest disruptions came through trade. In spring 2025, the Trump administration revived its “America First” agenda by threatening tariffs on Taiwanese imports, particularly electronics and auto parts, unless Taipei committed to expanding US investment and production.
The tariff threat signalled a shift from partnership to pressure, turning Taiwan into a trade target and raising doubts about US security reliability amid growing economic–political overlap.
Trump framed the move as a matter of “reciprocity,” accusing Taiwan of “stealing” the chip industry. In April, he announced 32% tariffs on a wide spectrum of Taiwan-made goods.
The rhetoric sent ripples through Taipei’s export-driven economy. Government officials scrambled to reassure Washington of Taiwan’s commitment to supply chain cooperation, while investors worried about potential retaliatory measures, sending the Taiwan stock market through wild swings.
Taiwan responded swiftly and proactively, with President Lai Ching-te saying his country was included in the first group to enter trade talks with the US. Lai pledged to strengthen bilateral investment and industrial cooperation and communicate more with Washington. In April, Lai began promoting a “Taiwan plus one” policy with the US that created a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to boost investment, strengthen trade, reduce the deficit, and foster mutual development.
The tariff threat, even if temporary, represented a marked shift in tone: Taiwan was being treated less as a strategic partner and more as a trade target. This presented the prospect of economic friction undermining confidence in US security commitments, blurring the line between political leverage and commercial pressure.
By September, the Trump administration proposed that Taiwan relocate 50% of chip production to the US. Opposition Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers condemned Washington’s proposal, and Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun dismissed speculation that Taiwan had agreed to such a split. This clash reinforced the perception that Washington’s new policy was driven less by shared strategy than by transactional bargaining. The message Taipei received from Washington was simple: invest more in America, or face tariffs.
Trump’s military signals to Taiwan were mixed: he pledged larger arms sales, yet later blocked US$400 million in aid while pursuing a trade deal with Xi.
STRATEGIC SIGNALLING
The year’s second major disruption came in the defence arena. In February, the US State Department briefly removed language from its website stating that Washington “does not support Taiwan independence.” Although the phrase was later restored, the change triggered immediate outrage from Beijing and confusion in Taipei.
Chinese officials condemned the edit as a “serious regression” in the US stance on Taiwan, while US diplomats downplayed it as a “routine update.” For Taiwan, the episode symbolised the mixed messaging that has defined Trump’s foreign policy — alternating between reassurance and provocation.
Meanwhile, Trump’s team sent contradictory signals on military assistance. On one hand, US officials in May said Trump aimed to exceed his first term’s weapons sales to Taiwan, including advanced drones and missiles. On the other hand, news broke in September that Trump had personally blocked over US$400 million in direct military aid to Taiwan as he tried to secure a trade deal with Xi.
Still, cooperation at the operational level persisted. In 2024, Taiwan News reported that US Green Berets were permanently stationed on Taiwan’s outlying islands for the first time, marking an unprecedented deepening of security cooperation. The programme continued quietly into 2025 despite political turbulence, demonstrating that the institutional defence relationship remained intact even as political signals fluctuated, with 500 US military personnel reportedly providing training in Taiwan as of May.
A Brookings Institution poll conducted from February to April found that only 37.5% of respondents believed the US would intervene militarily if China attacked — down from 44.5% in 2024. That erosion of public confidence underscored how Trump’s unpredictable messaging was reshaping perceptions of America’s role in the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan is widening ties with Europe and Indo-Pacific partners to hedge against US unpredictability, yet remains stuck — too reliant on Washington to detach, too uncertain to fully trust it.
DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR
Diplomacy proved equally volatile. In interviews while on the campaign trail, Trump questioned the US obligation to defend Taiwan, comparing it to an “insurance policy” and suggesting Taiwan should “pay us money for the protection.”
In one October appearance, Trump claimed that China “doesn’t want to attack Taiwan,” implying that media hype, not Chinese aggression, was inflaming tensions. He declined to answer a question about whether Taiwan would be sacrificed for a deal with China and said, “I want to be good to China. I love my relationship with President Xi. We have a great relationship.”
At the same time, Trump’s transactional diplomacy spilt into symbolic arenas. When Taiwan’s president planned a routine US transit in July, the White House reportedly denied approval to avoid upsetting Beijing ahead of trade negotiations. The move sparked criticism from Congress, where bipartisan lawmakers had just introduced the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, affirming Taiwan’s sovereignty under international law.
For Taiwan’s domestic politics, the uncertainty carried costs. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) faced criticism from Blue media outlets such as UDN for “over-reliance” on Washington. Opposition figures from the KMT argued that Trump’s unpredictability proved the need for renewed cross-strait dialogue. Scholars warned that the perception of US wavering could increase scepticism towards Washington and provide an opening for Beijing to push its narrative among Taiwanese that unification is the best option.
TAIWAN’S CAUTIOUS RECALIBRATION
Facing mixed messages from Washington, Taiwan has sought to project steadiness. President Lai has repeatedly emphasised the need to deepen the strategic partnership with the US while quietly hedging through diversified diplomacy. Taipei has strengthened security links with Japan and deepened dialogue with key European partners such as the UK, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania.
At home, the government raised its defence budget for 2026 to 3.32% of GDP and accelerated domestic missile production. Officials also launched new initiatives to reduce reliance on foreign supply chains for drones, satellites, and robotics — a response both to potential Chinese blockades and to Trump-era trade volatility.
In September, US State Department officials continued to reassure Taipei of support despite the turbulence. Behind closed doors, US diplomats stressed that operational cooperation and intelligence sharing were unaffected by political rhetoric.
Still, the damage inflicted on US–Taiwan ties is reputational. Even if the underlying commitments remain, the perception of unreliability can be just as destabilising. That perception matters not only in Taipei but across the region, where US allies watch for clues about Washington’s staying power.
BROADER IMPLICATIONS
The disruptions in US–Taiwan relations have reverberated beyond bilateral ties. For Beijing, Trump’s ambivalence created both opportunity and risk. Chinese officials welcomed rhetoric that downplayed the threat of invasion but worried that US unpredictability could still trigger crises. Chinese military flights around Taiwan continued at record levels, while the US did little substantive beyond urging Beijing to refrain from further actions.
For US allies like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, Trump’s transactional approach raised doubts about alliance reliability. If Washington wavers on Taiwan — a democracy central to Indo-Pacific strategy — it would inflict immense damage on the credibility of its security guarantees elsewhere.
Economically, Taiwan’s vulnerability exposed the limits of its export model. As tariffs and technology restrictions reshaped global supply chains, Taipei simultaneously pushed to build out local high-tech capacity and attract investment from non-US partners. However, although these moves improve economic resilience, they do not substitute for Taiwan’s traditional role in supporting the US–Taiwan technology alliance underpinning deterrence.
THE BOTTOM LINE
For now, US–Taiwan ties remain structurally strong. The Taiwan Relations Act still anchors legal commitments, bipartisan support in Congress remains solid, and the Pentagon continues coordination with Taipei. Yet the tone from the Trump administration has unsettled what was once a predictable partnership.
The disruptions of 2025 — in trade, security, and diplomacy — reveal less a collapse than a recalibration. Under Trump, the US relationship with Taiwan has become more transactional, less predictable, and more dependent on personal politics than institutional policy. For Taiwan, that means balancing gratitude for enduring US support with realism about shifting priorities in Washington.
As Trump’s second term unfolds, the central question is whether unpredictability will remain a feature or give way to renewed strategic coherence. For a small democracy perched between superpowers, clarity can be as critical as commitment. Until that returns, Taiwan will continue navigating its most important partnership with caution.
(Keoni Everington is an American senior journalist based in Taipei, Taiwan with 15 years of experience covering news about Taiwan and China. Everington specialises in subjects such as cross-strait relations, US-Taiwan ties and international geopolitics. The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Herald.)
Key Takeaways
- Trump’s return disrupted the previously stable US–Taiwan strategic partnership.
- Tariff threats turned Taiwan from ally to trade target, shaking economic confidence.
- Mixed military signals blurred US security reliability and emboldened Beijing.
- Taiwan hedged by expanding ties with Europe and Indo-Pacific partners.
- Relationship now transactional, unpredictable, and driven by Trump’s personal politics over policy.
