As Russia prepares to assume the CSTO Chairmanship in 2026, the alliance stands at a crossroads of relevance, cohesion and power. Fractured by the Ukraine war, shifting Eurasian geopolitics, and the expanding influence of China, Iran and Turkey, the bloc now faces internal distrust and external competition that challenge its future as a credible collective security mechanism.
AMBASSADOR SRIKUMAR MENON, IFS(R) | FOR NEWS ANALYTICS
5 mins read.
The recent summit meeting of the ‘Collective Security Treaty Organisation’ (CSTO), held in November 2025 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, concluded with the reaffirmation of the bloc’s commitment to regional security and political coordination. The Russian Federation was nominated to host the next summit meeting in Moscow in November 2026.
As Russia takes over the Chairmanship of the 6-member grouping from 1 January 2026 and seeks to reassert power in a multipolar Eurasia, it would be the right time to look back at the past five years of the international political landscape, which, at best, can be characterised as “unstable, fluid, and constantly changing”.
International relations in today’s world have been reconfigured in ways that would have been difficult to foresee in 2020. This unpredictability has been induced by the emergence of new power dynamics, amid the steady erosion of old structures of power and the dismantling of familiar diplomatic and strategic frameworks.
Shifting geopolitical trends have triggered changes in the post-Soviet dynamics and regional power plays. The emergence of the post-Cold War international order was marked by the rise of new powers like China; the formation of new groupings like BRICS, SCO, CSTO, etc., thereby creating a multipolar world where smaller nations had space to diversify their aspirations. This holds true for the Eurasian Central Asian region as well.
Russia’s chairmanship begins as the CSTO faces internal fractures, fading cohesion, and a serious credibility test for collective security.
CSTO – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The CSTO forms part of Russia’s vision for a multipolar Eurasia. It came into being – after the dismantling of the Soviet Union – as a natural progression of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty with former Soviet republics under the CIS framework.
The CSTO was set up in 2002, comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Russia contributes more than 60 per cent of the budget, including troops, rapid reaction forces, and logistics support, while addressing hybrid threats like terrorism and extremism.
In effect, it is Russia’s de facto military alliance, serving as an instrument of securing its “privileged interests”. Informally labelled as the “Eurasian NATO”, the CSTO outlines mutual defence commitments – including a collective response to external aggression.
Detractors have often described the CSTO as a vehicle for Russian hegemony – rather than a collective defence coalition like NATO. To put this in context, Russia, in the past, has been criticised for selectively invoking the Article 4 clause on ‘external aggression’ (similar to NATO’s Article 5) to justify its interventions or presence in member states.
One such instance was in January 2022, when Russia led a rapid CSTO deployment of 2,500 troops – comprising mostly Russian paratroopers – to Kazakhstan to suppress widespread local unrest and protests over rising fuel prices. This helped to prop up the Kazakh regime of the day.
This was in sharp contrast to Russia’s earlier declining to respond to Armenia’s call for assistance during the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflicts in 2020 within the Nagorno-Karabakh region and in 2022, when Azerbaijani forces entered Armenian sovereign territory. Russia, on this occasion, was criticised for ignoring the CSTO article and choosing to ‘maintain a balance with Azerbaijan and Turkey’.
PRESENT CONTEXT & CHALLENGES
Russia takes over the 2026 CSTO Chairmanship amid widening rifts and a drift in Central Asian collaboration. Armenia appears increasingly alienated than ever before. It finds itself vulnerable amid regional powers like Iran, Turkey and Russia, thus being forced to seek new security arrangements.
Armenia announced in February 2024 that it was freezing its participation in the CSTO, abstaining from activities and financial contributions and even considering withdrawal, over the bloc’s failure to support it during the conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia boycotted the November 2025 Bishkek summit – the second consecutive occasion it had opted to stay out. Russia now must address increasingly strident Armenian demands while projecting an appearance of unity in the bloc.
Let’s look at the other members in the group. Belarus has been a reliable partner, hosting CSTO exercises and integrating its forces into Russian command structures, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are dependent on Russian bases in their territories for border security, specifically to ward off threats from across the Afghan border. Significantly, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has contributed to the economic interdependence of its members, which in turn strengthens loyalty towards Russia.
The Ukraine war exposed Russia’s weakened military authority, limiting the CSTO’s ability to respond to crises across Eurasia.
IMPACT OF THE UKRAINE WAR
The CSTO grapples with concerns over its very relevance, viability and existence, just as the world moves from a state of ‘unipolar dominance’ to ‘multipolarity’ – primarily manifested by factors like the dominant rise of China, the eroding US hegemony, the instability in Afghanistan, and the impact of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s ‘Ukraine war’ strategy will have a bearing on its upcoming Chairmanship of the CSTO, more so given the fact that the strategy does not conform to the security interests of its other partners.
The Ukraine war has aggravated existing tensions and posed challenges to the alliance’s crumbling façade of unity – exposing significant differences of interest among CSTO members. What is significant is that the other five members did not offer military assistance to Russia, while all (except Belarus) distanced themselves from the conflict – either staying neutral or abstaining from UN votes critical of Russia.
The war has brought into sharp focus Russian military weaknesses, triggered crippling sanctions, and eroded its global stature, severely limiting its capacity to project power in its neighbourhood. This diminished capacity has left the CSTO unable to respond effectively to crises in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, pushing partners like Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan to seek closer ties with China and Turkey.
As CSTO influence shrinks, China, Iran and Turkey expand their strategic footprint across Central Asia.
EURASIAN PIVOT
China’s dominance in the SCO at the expense of Russia is an indication of a subtle transition of power in the region. The Chinese approach has been to avoid visible CSTO rivalry and friction, and instead opt to go along with Russia’s “cooperative hegemony”. Yet, the fact that Russia was forced to move large numbers of troops from its bases in Tajikistan to bolster its Ukraine campaign provides that much-needed opening for China to reach out to the Tajiks.
China played a prominent role at the Central Asia Summit in Astana in June 2025 – riding on its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to sell the idea of connectivity and stability to its partners – a step towards gradual usurping of Russian influence in the region.
As the CSTO’s influence seemingly diminishes in Central Asia, Iran finds itself with more space and manoeuvrability to strengthen its security ties and deepen cooperation with member states. With Russia getting distracted by its Ukraine campaign, and with fewer competing influences, Iran is now better placed than before to effectively extend its strategic reach, foster military and intelligence partnerships, and position itself as a key security actor in this geopolitically vital area, thereby enhancing its leverage across Central Asia’s evolving security landscape.
Similarly, Turkey has been rapidly expanding its leverage in Central Asia through the Organisation of Turkic States, the Middle Corridor trade route, forging new FTAs, and upgrading defence ties through drone sales and joint training. Turkey has offered Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan attractive options and alternatives to Russian support, besides pushing ahead with cultural initiatives and economic integration. This places Turkey as a key geopolitical player in the region, without getting into confrontation with Moscow.
LOOKING AHEAD: CSTO-2026
Russia assumes the new Chairmanship role on 1 January 2026, under the motto “Collective Security in a Multipolar World: Common Goal – Shared Responsibility.” In doing so, Russia, as one analyst put it, “will make a calculated bid to reclaim strategic influence” and continue to project itself as a viable counterweight to Euro-Atlantic structures. Undoubtedly, Russia will leverage the stewardship role to promote its military agenda in Ukraine, while aiming to minimise Western influence. This offers Russia a window of opportunity to disentangle itself from the mess it finds itself in Ukraine, while at the same time exploiting the recent resurgence of active multipolar outreach within the Eurasian region, driven by an increase in demand for munitions and armaments supply. Russia would be keen to retain its influence on its CSTO partners, while being wary of the increasing sway and power being wielded by China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
In a multipolar Eurasia, the CSTO’s viability will depend on Russia’s ability to reform the bloc and cultivate a sense of shared Eurasian sovereignty. Moscow is likely to advance major rearmament programmes for member states and adopt a revised anti-terror strategy focused on blunting hybrid threats from Afghanistan, emphasising intelligence sharing and rapid-deployment capabilities. Russia will rely on its longstanding political, security, and economic ties with partners to maintain influence and reassert its leadership in Central Asia. It would prioritise deepening military integration, strengthening member-state security structures, enhancing training and air defences, and conducting regular joint exercise.
Analysts suggest that the CSTO under Russia’s watch “may solidify as a tool of asymmetric dominance, rather than equitable partnership – reflecting the tensions of multipolar realignments”.
As Chair of CSTO-2026, Russia has its work cut out. It faces the difficult, yet critical task of decisively reinforcing the group’s operational coherence and strategic relevance, while preserving the alliance’s solidarity, cohesion and sense of collective purpose.
(Ambassador Srikumar Menon, IFS (R.), former Ambassador of India to South Sudan, Angola and Sao Tome & Principe. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Herald.)
Quick Insights
- Russia assumes CSTO leadership at a time of internal fractures and visibly declining regional unity.
- Armenia’s growing alienation exposes serious structural weaknesses in the bloc’s promise of collective security.
- The Ukraine war has significantly weakened Russia’s military credibility and its authority across Eurasia.
- China, Iran and Turkey are steadily expanding influence as the CSTO’s relevance continues to erode.
- The CSTO’s future now hinges on Russia’s capacity to reform the bloc and restore confidence.
