The United States and China continue to talk, not because rivalry is fading, but because the costs of miscalculation are rising.
By Justus Nam | Nairobi, Kenya | Former Foreign Service Officer & Africa Expert | For The News Analytics Herald
3 mins read.
The United States and China continue to engage not because they trust one another, but because silence has become too dangerous. Military hotlines, senior-level meetings and working groups have resumed, yet these mechanisms are designed less to build cooperation than to prevent confrontation. What exists today is a framework for managing strategic distrust. The world’s two largest powers increasingly see each other as long-term competitors, but neither can afford an unmanaged crisis. Engagement has become a tool of risk management rather than reconciliation.
MANAGING DISTRUST
This marks a departure from post-Cold War assumptions that economic interdependence would moderate geopolitical rivalry. China’s integration into the global economy appeared to validate that belief. Instead, bilateral trade exceeded US$570 billion in 2025 while technology restrictions, investment screening and military competition intensified. Economic integration did not eliminate rivalry; it created new arenas in which rivalry could unfold.
Economic interdependence did not prevent rivalry; it simply created new arenas through which strategic competition could unfold.
Nowhere is this more visible than Taiwan. For Beijing, Taiwan is tied to national reunification and political legitimacy; for Washington, it is increasingly linked to the credibility of American alliances across the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan also sits at the heart of the global technology ecosystem, producing more than 60 percent of the world’s semiconductors and over 90 percent of its most advanced chips.
Any major disruption in the Taiwan Strait would reverberate through manufacturing, financial markets, defence industries and emerging technologies. China has expanded military exercises and air patrols, while the United States has strengthened security cooperation with Japan, Australia and the Philippines. Neither side seeks war, but both invest heavily in deterrence because neither believes trust can preserve stability.
TECHNOLOGY WARS
Technology has become another major front. Semiconductors underpin artificial intelligence, advanced communications, quantum computing and modern weapons systems. Washington’s restrictions on advanced chips and manufacturing equipment reflect the growing convergence of technological leadership and national security. Beijing has responded by accelerating technological self-sufficiency and restricting exports of critical minerals.
Supply-chain resilience, technological dependence, critical minerals and industrial capacity now shape foreign policy alongside conventional military concerns.
Taiwan has become the most dangerous intersection of military deterrence, technological dominance and great-power credibility.
The consequences extend globally. Companies increasingly weigh geopolitical risk alongside labour costs and market access, while governments invest heavily in strategic industries and diversified supply chains. The IMF has warned that severe geoeconomic fragmentation could reduce global output by as much as 7 percent over the long term. Strategic competition is reshaping trade, finance, industrial policy and technological development far beyond either power.
AFRICA’S LEVERAGE
Africa is increasingly central to these shifts. The energy transition and advanced manufacturing have increased demand for resources across the continent. The Democratic Republic of Congo supplies more than 70 percent of global cobalt production, Zambia is a major copper producer, and Zimbabwe possesses significant lithium reserves. Rare earths, graphite, manganese and nickel are becoming critical to future industries.
Yet strategic importance has historically failed to produce broad-based industrial transformation. What makes the current moment different is Africa’s increased bargaining power. External powers are competing for resources, markets, logistics corridors and industrial partnerships, while the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers a market of roughly 1.4 billion people with combined GDP exceeding US$3.4 trillion.
Competition is already visible. The United States and partners are backing the Lobito Corridor to diversify critical mineral supply chains. China continues expanding infrastructure, industrial projects and mineral value chains under the Belt and Road Initiative, while the European Union, Gulf states, India and others pursue their own initiatives.
OPPORTUNITY OR DEPENDENCE
The challenge is converting leverage into lasting economic gains. Whether Africa should align with Washington or Beijing is the wrong question. Both pursue their interests through different instruments. The priority for African governments should be securing better outcomes while maintaining policy autonomy.
Access to minerals matters, but processing, refining, manufacturing and technology transfer matter more. Exporting cobalt, lithium and copper generates revenue; building battery manufacturing, mineral processing and industrial ecosystems generates development.
Africa’s opportunity lies not in choosing sides, but in converting strategic relevance into lasting industrial capability.
The Sahel demonstrates that external engagement alone cannot create development or stability. French retrenchment, expanding Russian security partnerships, China’s economic presence and recalibrated American engagement have created a crowded geopolitical landscape, yet insecurity persists. External actors cannot substitute for domestic institutions, regional cooperation or coherent national strategies. Countries without strategies risk becoming arenas for others’ competition; those with clear priorities can better shape the terms of engagement.
The fragile logic of US-China engagement therefore extends far beyond their bilateral relationship. Both continue talking because neither can afford unmanaged confrontation, even as Taiwan, technology, military power and supply chains deepen their rivalry.
For Africa, this competition creates a potentially historic opening. Rising demand for its resources, markets and connectivity coincides with intensifying competition among major powers. Influence increasingly flows through supply chains, technology ecosystems and critical minerals rather than traditional geopolitical alignments.
Africa’s challenge is not simply to participate in these networks, but to move up them. Failure to transform strategic relevance into industrial capability would once again leave the continent supplying raw materials for transformation elsewhere. Success could make this era of great-power competition the moment Africa moved from being an object of geopolitical rivalry to one of its principal beneficiaries.
(Justus Nam is a geopolitical analyst, a former Foreign Service Officer and a former Research Fellow at the Lancaster University China Centre. His work focuses on African geopolitics, diplomacy, and security, with particular attention to regional integration and China–Africa relations. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Herald.)
