As India assumes the BRICS presidency next year, experts from New Delhi to São Paulo reveal how the world’s largest democracy faces a difficult choice: balance strategic autonomy between East and West, or risk fracturing the Global South’s most ambitious challenge to Western dominance. With an $85 billion trade deficit with China and growing pressure from both Washington and Beijing, India’s next moves will determine whether BRICS becomes a genuine multipolar force or collapses under the weight of great power rivalry.
RICARDO MARTINS | CURITIBA, BRAZIL
LATIN AMERICA CORRESPONDENT, NEWS ANALYTICS
a 5 mins read.
Indian geopolitical analyst Musharraf Khan pulls up trade statistics, as the numbers tell a story that encapsulates India’s fundamental BRICS dilemma. “India’s ballooning trade deficit with China, over $85 billion in FY2024, raises a harder question: who’s really gaining from this platform?” he asks, his reasoning carrying the weight of someone who has watched India’s strategic calculations evolve in real time.
This question lies at the heart of India’s complex relationship with BRICS, a relationship that has become even more complicated as the bloc expanded beyond its original five members to include new partners across Latin America, Africa, and Asia, coming under close scrutiny by U.S. President Donald Trump.
From conversations with experts spanning five continents, from Brazilian sustainability advocates to Russian institutional analysts, from Emirati strategic thinkers to Dutch political observers, a picture emerges of India as the critical swing player whose choices will determine whether BRICS becomes a genuine multipolar force or fractures under the weight of its internal contradictions.
BENEFITS Vs ASYMMETRIES
Khan’s analysis reveals the sophisticated calculus behind India’s BRICS engagement. “BRICS offers India a platform for strategic leverage, but the benefits are offset by deep structural constraints,” he explains, presenting data that shows China’s overwhelming dominance within the bloc. The New Development Bank offers alternative financing when “Western capital is drying up,” yet the fundamental economic asymmetry with China “casts a long shadow over any vision of equitable South–South cooperation.”
From another perspective, strategic studies expert Soumyajit Gupta at the National Defence University presents India’s advantages within BRICS with characteristic academic precision. India arrives with “a well-furnished toolkit: diplomatic clout, fintech innovations, and a track record in conflict mediation,” he argues. The country’s digital achievements, such as UPI’s ubiquity, Aadhaar’s reach, and the Open Network for Digital Commerce, offer “a blueprint for modernizing BRICS’ payment architecture” that could benefit the entire bloc.
Yet Gupta acknowledges the elephant in the room: “China accounts for more than half of all intra-BRICS trade, and every member runs a trade deficit with Beijing.” This economic reality enables China to “shape BRICS agendas to its advantage, potentially sidelining initiatives that India prioritises.” The challenge for India becomes how to leverage its technological and diplomatic assets while preventing Chinese economic dominance from translating into institutional control.
India’s “non-Western, not anti-West” stance keeps ties open, enabling BRICS engagement while preserving vital partnerships with the US, Japan, and Australia through the Quad.
THE POST-GALWAN REALITY
India’s approach to BRICS cannot be understood without considering the dramatic shift in India–China relations following the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes. Khan describes this transformation with clinical precision: “The post-Galwan shift in India’s China policy has been stark, marked by hedging, hard balancing, and a turn to minilateral forums like Quad and I2U2.”
This shift fundamentally altered India’s BRICS calculus. “Delhi stays in BRICS for two reasons: strategy, and survival,” Khan explains. “The grouping allows for diplomatic engagement with China under structured constraints, but it does not resolve the core geopolitical distrust.” India’s continued participation becomes less about trust-building and more about preventing China from completely dominating Global South narratives.
The sophistication of India’s approach lies in what Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar famously describes as being “non-Western, but not anti-West.” Khan elaborates: “That identity, non-Western, not anti-West, keeps doors open both ways. But it only works if BRICS stays grounded in outcomes, not ideology.” This positioning allows India to simultaneously engage with BRICS while maintaining critical partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia through the Quad.
DEMOCRATIC PRESSURES
Multiple Indian respondents note “cautiously supportive” public sentiment toward deeper BRICS ties, driven by expectations of economic gains and strategic partnerships, particularly with China. Yet this support comes with caveats.
As put by Manu Bhat, “Indians, albeit worried about China, are in favour of BRICS as a way to place ourselves in the geopolitical sphere.” The public sees BRICS membership as advancing national interests through increased investment and strengthened strategic partnerships. However, concerns linger about China’s dominance and whether tangible benefits will materialize, especially given India’s complex relationship with Pakistan, another BRICS aspirant that India’s position within the bloc helps to exclude.
The democratic dimension also influences India’s approach to BRICS expansion. Unlike authoritarian members who can make rapid strategic pivots, India must consider domestic opinion, parliamentary debates, and media scrutiny of its international commitments. This democratic accountability creates both constraints and legitimacy that distinguish India’s participation, along with some others, from other BRICS members.
THE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Despite economic asymmetries, India brings unique institutional innovations to BRICS that could reshape the bloc’s trajectory. Gupta highlights India’s “fintech triumphs, UPI’s ubiquity and the digital rupee pilot” as offering concrete alternatives to Chinese-dominated payment systems. While China and Russia “champion de-dollarization outright, India can champion a more incremental approach” through digital infrastructure development.
This technological leadership extends beyond payments to governance platforms. India’s experience with digital identity systems, e-governance platforms, and digital public goods provides models for other developing nations seeking technological sovereignty. As one expert notes, India’s ability to “take UPI, Aadhaar, and ONDC global” represents “a move that’s promising, but internal gaps in state capacity and federal coordination limit its scalability.”
The challenge lies in converting technological innovation into institutional influence. Gupta warns that “showcasing is easier than scaling,” and India must strengthen domestic foundations to globalise its innovations effectively. Success would position India as an alternative to Chinese technological models while offering developing nations options beyond Western platforms.
REGIONAL COMPLEXITIES
India’s BRICS engagement cannot be separated from broader regional dynamics, particularly the Pakistan relationship. Pakistani analyst Khalid Mahmood acknowledges that “India is a founding BRICS member and has significant clout in the group. Ongoing Pakistan–India tensions limit the possibility of Pakistan joining BRICS shortly.”
This dynamic gives India effective veto power over regional expansion, allowing it to shape BRICS’ South Asian footprint. Yet it also creates responsibilities: India must balance its strategic interests with BRICS’ broader Global South solidarity goals. Too aggressive use of this veto could undermine India’s credibility as a leader of developing nations.
The expansion to include countries like Iran adds another layer of complexity. India maintains important economic ties with Iran while navigating U.S. sanctions and regional security concerns. As one analyst notes, Iran’s inclusion “brings in geopolitical baggage related to U.S. sanctions, regional proxy conflicts, and its role in the Israel–Palestine crisis” that complicates consensus-building.
BRICS nations do not look favourably on India’s close alignment with Israel. This position risks turning public opinion across the Global South against India, where the Palestinian cause is widely seen as one of the most pressing and symbolic anti-colonial struggles of our time.
India’s BRICS presidency draws global anticipation and caution, testing its skill in balancing Western ties, Quad commitments, and Global South aspirations while preserving strategic autonomy.
INDIA’S PRESIDENTIAL TEST
As India assumes the BRICS presidency next year, experts across the spectrum identify this as a decisive moment for both the country and the bloc. Moroccan analyst Yassine El Bouchikhi frames the stakes starkly: “India, the next chairman of the BRICS, must clearly decide on its strategic position: either to be an important vassal of the West or to build independence with the BRICS and overcome its lack of trust in China and Russia.”
This framing, while perhaps overstated, captures the pressure India faces to provide clearer strategic direction. Brazilian sustainability expert Claudya Piazera emphasizes that multipolarity only works if India and other democratic members can “strengthen multipolarity” by keeping BRICS “open, inclusive, and focused on agenda setting” rather than allowing it to “crystallize into a tightly aligned bloc opposing Western institutions.”
Russian expert Andrey Kortunov offers a more pragmatic assessment, noting that India’s leadership could help BRICS evolve from “a high-level political club into one of the indispensable building blocks for the emerging world order.” Success requires India to balance its domestic priorities with bloc cohesion while managing both Chinese dominance and Western pressure.
THE GLOBAL STAKES
India’s BRICS choices carry implications far beyond bilateral relationships. As the world’s largest democracy and fastest-growing major economy, India’s strategic direction influences broader patterns of global alignment. Success in balancing BRICS engagement with Western partnerships could provide a model for other middle powers seeking strategic autonomy.
Yet failure risks validating zero-sum approaches that push the world toward renewed bipolarity. Khan concludes with characteristic precision: “If BRICS can remain a platform for issue-based cooperation on tech governance, climate resilience, or health equity, India will continue to play a shaping role. If not, the logic of strategic diversification may push India toward a quieter disengagement.”
India’s upcoming BRICS presidency is being watched with a mix of expectation and unease, particularly by fellow BRICS members and across the Global South. Its ability to navigate competing pressures from its Western partnerships and Quad commitments to the collective aspirations of the Global South will test its strategic autonomy and balancing act.
(Ricardo Martins. PhD in Sociology, specialising in international relations, geopolitics, and Latin American politics. He recently completed his postdoctoral fellowship at Utrecht University in the Netherlands and covers major developments in Latin America for News Analytics. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Herald.)
Major Highlights
- India faces BRICS challenge, balancing East-West ties while managing China trade deficit.
- Experts highlight India’s technological, diplomatic, and institutional strengths within BRICS.
- Post-Galwan tensions drive India’s strategic hedging and cautious engagement with China.
- Regional dynamics, including Pakistan and Iran, complicate BRICS expansion and consensus.
- India’s 2025 BRICS presidency will test its leadership, autonomy, and bloc cohesion.
