The recent horrific terrorist attack in Pahalgam, which killed 26 innocent tourists, has further strained already tense ties between India and Pakistan. If this incident escalates into a major conflict between the two nuclear powers, China will likely play a critical role as Pakistan’s largest ally. Accurately predicting Beijing’s response requires a comprehensive analysis of its multifaceted strategic objectives in South Asia, its intricate and often contrasting relationships with India and Pakistan.
KEONI EVERINGTON, TAIPEI, TAIWAN
TAIWAN & CHINA CORRESPONDENT, THE NEWS ANALYTICS JOURNAL
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During a press conference on April 23, a member of the media pointed out that US President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and other leaders had condemned the Pahalgam assault and asked whether China had any comment on the incident. China Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun said Beijing has received relevant reports and “strongly condemns this attack.”
Guo said that China firmly opposes all forms of terrorism. He added, “We mourn for the lives lost and express sincere sympathies to the bereaved families and the injured.”
China’s ambitions in South Asia are tied to its economic and strategic goals. Central to this is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) at its heart. Beijing plans to use CPEC to connect China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan’s deep-sea ports of Gwadar and Karachi through a network of infrastructure projects. Regional instability, especially involving Pakistan, would threaten this vital project and Beijing’s larger Eurasian connectivity plans.
China also sees South Asia as a key arena in its rivalry with India. By bolstering Pakistan, Beijing aims to contain India’s growing influence, especially as New Delhi strengthens ties with the U.S. and the Indo-Pacific alliance known as the Quad.
Tensions along the Sino-Indian border deepen China’s interest in the region’s power balance, with Beijing naturally wanting to tip the scale in Pakistan’s favor to facilitate its designs.
THE “ALL-WEATHER” ALLIANCE
China and Pakistan have had a long history of diplomatic ties since 1951. Similar to China and Russia’s “no limits” strategic partnership, declared in 2022, Beijing and Islamabad reached a new level of cooperation with an “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership” declared in 2015.
Based on a shared rivalry with India, their relationship has expanded through extensive Chinese military and economic assistance to Pakistan. This includes joint defense projects like the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet and the rapid transfer of advanced PL-15 long-range, air-to-air missiles, altering the regional military balance.
Diplomatically, China has consistently supported Pakistan, particularly on Kashmir. While it has historically called for bilateral solutions, Beijing’s tone has shifted toward openly backing Islamabad, especially after India revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.
The 1963 Sino-Pakistani border agreement, ceding the Shaksgam Valley to China, further complicates the territorial disputes in the region. This is because it has created a trilateral dimension to the Kashmir issue, granting China a strategic foothold in the region claimed by India.
Despite its strong support for Pakistan, China maintains significant, albeit strained, relations with India. Trade between the two nations has grown substantially, though it heavily favors China’s exports. Both countries are members of multilateral groups such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), creating platforms for engagement.
However, tensions persist due to the unresolved border dispute, China’s strong strategic ties with Pakistan, and India’s deepening partnership with the U.S. and its allies. China regards India’s rising assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific with caution and remains alert to any moves that could undermine its regional influence.
PARALLELS FROM UKRAINE WAR
To predict China’s behavior in a potential India-Pakistan conflict, some strong clues can be drawn from its approach to Russia’s war in Ukraine. China has outwardly maintained neutrality, calling for peace while continuing economic and diplomatic support for Russia, a stance the West has accused Beijing of being biased.
Key actions China has taken to support Russia during its invasion of Ukraine include an economic lifeline, diplomatic shield, non-lethal military support, selective sovereignty stances, and protecting investments. China has helped Russia cushion Western sanctions by ramping up energy imports and supplying goods. A similar, though potentially smaller, economic safety net could be extended to Pakistan in a conflict.
China has shielded Russia from harsh UN condemnation, proposing peace initiatives that avoid directly criticizing Moscow. In South Asia, Beijing would likely diplomatically defend Pakistan, urging dialogue without blaming Islamabad.
Although China has not been proven to send lethal weapons to Russia, it has supplied dual-use goods, such as semiconductors, drone components, and vehicles. In a South Asian conflict, Beijing might speed up delivery of existing military deals and offer intelligence and logistical help to Pakistan, such as PL-15 missiles.
While stressing sovereignty and territorial integrity for Ukraine, China’s stance on Kashmir favors Pakistan. This selective approach demonstrates China’s tendency to prioritize strategic interests over the consistent application of international norms.
Any conflict endangering Chinese personnel or infrastructure in Pakistan could prompt a strong response from Beijing, possibly involving demands for greater security or even unilateral protective actions.
CHINA’S LIKELY ACTIONS
Based on China’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war, combined with its strategic interests and ties with India and Pakistan, Beijing’s involvement in a potential conflict would likely include strong diplomatic, economic, logistical support for Pakistan. China would attempt to maintain a façade of neutrality, engage in limited military signaling to India, protect CPEC and Chinese citizens, and leverage international forums.
Following its approach with Russia, China would probably extend strong diplomatic support to Pakistan in international forums. It would likely oppose efforts to condemn Pakistan at the UN Security Council and reaffirm its traditional stance on Kashmir, potentially casting India as the aggressor or the catalyst for the conflict.
Following its Russian model, China could offer vital economic assistance and logistical backing to Pakistan. This support might take the form of financial aid, fuel shipments, and the fast-tracking of military equipment and spare parts deliveries.
Although the direct deployment of Chinese troops remains highly unlikely, the supply of advanced weaponry, such as the reported transfer of PL-15 missiles, highlights China’s readiness to strengthen Pakistan’s military capabilities. Such actions would significantly impact the regional balance and signal Beijing’s commitment to its strategic partner.
As with its position on Ukraine, China would likely urge de-escalation and dialogue between India and Pakistan. Yet its rhetoric and actions would probably reveal a clear bias toward Pakistan, highlighting Islamabad’s concerns, particularly over Kashmir, while subtly criticizing India’s military moves.
To prevent India from concentrating all its military resources on its western border, China might engage in limited military posturing along the Sino-Indian border. This could include ramped-up military exercises or troop deployments, signaling concern and compelling India to divert attention and resources to its northern frontier, similar to China’s strategy of tying down Western resources in its support for Russia.
The protection of CPEC and the thousands of Chinese nationals in Pakistan would be a top priority for Beijing. As demonstrated by its recent deployment of private security forces in response to growing terror threats, China would likely press Islamabad for stricter security measures and may take unilateral actions if it deems Pakistan’s efforts inadequate.
China would likely leverage platforms such as the SCO and collaborate with like-minded nations to advance its narrative and push for a resolution that aligns with its strategic interests, including a stable and secure Pakistan. This approach mirrors its attempts to present peace proposals in the Ukraine conflict, reflecting its broader diplomatic strategy.
KEY DIFFERENCES
While parallels can be drawn, crucial distinctions exist between the Russia-Ukraine war and a potential India-Pakistan conflict that would shape China’s role. Notable differences include nuclear risk, direct border disputes, the U.S. factor, and historical hostilities.
The existence of nuclear weapons on both sides of the India-Pakistan border greatly heightens the potential for escalation. This may cause China to exercise even greater caution in taking actions that could be seen as directly escalating the situation.
Unlike its situation with Ukraine, China has a direct and unresolved border dispute with India. Any conflict involving India could potentially escalate or introduce new dynamics along the Sino-Indian border, a factor that Beijing would need to carefully assess.
Under Trump’s second term, the US has a strengthening strategic partnership with India, unlike its rocky relationship with Ukraine. While the Biden administration offered substantial military and financial aid to Ukraine, Washington’s ties with India are more firmly based on mutual concerns about China’s rise as it pivots to Asia, which could result in a stronger US response in support of India, potentially affecting Beijing’s calculous.
The long-standing conflict and mistrust between India and Pakistan, along with China’s steady support for Pakistan, create a distinct dynamic compared to the more recent and evolving relationship between China and Russia regarding Ukraine. This difference further shapes China’s approach to the potential India-Pakistan conflict.
A CALIBRATED APPROACH
In the event of a conflict between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam terror attack, China could play a significant yet measured role. Drawing from its experience with the Russia-Ukraine war, Beijing will likely provide strong diplomatic and economic support to Pakistan while maintaining a publicly neutral stance and calling for dialogue.
China would likely undertake limited military signaling along its border with India to deter a full Indian focus on its western front, while simultaneously prioritizing the robust protection of its significant economic investments in Pakistan, most notably CPEC. This two-pronged approach would aim to both strategically constrain India and safeguard China’s crucial regional economic and connectivity projects.
However, the distinct dynamics of South Asia, including the nuclear factor and the direct Sino-Indian border dispute, will require China to adopt a more cautious approach than its actions in Ukraine. Though direct military involvement is highly improbable, China’s multifaceted backing of Pakistan will play a crucial role in shaping the conflict’s direction, with the international community closely watching Beijing’s response to avoid exacerbating tensions in an already volatile, nuclear-armed region.
(Keoni Everington is an American senior journalist based in Taipei, Taiwan with 15 years of experience covering news about Taiwan and China. Everington specialises in subjects such as cross-strait relations, US-Taiwan ties and international geopolitics. The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Journal.)
Major Highlights
- China’s core goals of safeguarding the CPEC and containing India’s regional rise, would push Beijing to back Pakistan in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict.
- China would likely offer Pakistan diplomatic support, economic aid and non-lethal military assistance while officially calling for peace as a façade of neutrality.
- China could increase military activities along the India-China border to pressure India into splitting its military focus, helping Pakistan indirectly.
- China’s top priority would be to protect its major economic interests and citizens in Pakistan, possibly demanding tighter Pakistani security measures.
- Given the presence of nuclear weapons and unresolved Sino-Indian border tensions, China would act more cautiously than it did in Ukraine.
