NewsAnalytics Bureau
a 5 mins read.
Regional Growth
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) emerged from the original Shanghai Five mechanism in June 2001. The Shanghai Five itself was constituted in 1996 comprising the five states as its members China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. However, it was not formalised. The mechanism aimed to integrate Eurasian nations into greater economic and security bonding. It was later decided to enhance the scope and profile as more countries evinced interest in the mechanism. In 2001 during the summit meeting in Shanghai and with the admittance of Uzbekistan as the sixth member, the SCO was formally institutionalised to replace the Shanghai Five.
The SCO goals were defined to primarily establish trust, consultations, benefits, and regional growth with the vision of a multipolar world order. SCO charter has unambiguous references for collectively ensuring and maintaining peace, security, and stability in the region while it unequivocally denounces terrorism, separatism, and extremism in all their manifestations, it also encourages jointly combating this menace. The essence of SCO has been cooperation across varied spheres from culture, and economy to security while ensuring non-interference in internal matters of its members.
SCO has indeed been the outcome of the joint lead taken by China and Russia to create an international grouping that can withstand global economic and security challenges while progressing the vision of multi-polarity as its cornerstone. The grouping has advocated the creation of an SCO currency as a substitute for US dollars, anw and an independent financial system as an alternative to SWIFT. In security, it promotes grouping’s joint military exercises and even suggests that options for military intervention by SCO should be kept open in the future. SCO also famously declined the US observer status in 2005 but granted the same to Iran. It’s not surprising that Western observers feel SCO is an “anti-NATO” grouping.
Compatibility Challenges
The Global Times of China in a commentary in 2022 has tried to steer clear of anti-NATO accusations for SCO. It highlighted how SCO is an inclusive idea, unlike West-promoted security organisations such as NATO which makes security guarantees for members of G7 and EU. It further stressed how economic cooperation has been restricted among “democratic nations” only clearly ignoring China and Russia as potential members.
The emergence of SCO and the underlying concept has always been to promote a ‘non-westernised’ worldview while decoupling the Eurasian region from the influence of the US. In May 2005 with nudging from SCO, Uzbekistan declined its K2 airbase to the US and asked it to vacate within six months. Türkiye, another key observer in the SCO was offered permanent membership of SCO in the trade-off for it leaving the EU. That’s not all, in November 2016 Türkiye also got a reward with the chairmanship of the SCO Energy Club even though it wasn’t still a member!
SCO, however, faces some compatibility challenges among its members, at its inception itself the relationship between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan has been highly volatile, Russian commitments to SCO have also come under the lens as it subsequently established other organisations such as Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in October 2002 and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2014. These organisations are not only overlapping in mandate with the majority of SCO members as a common partner but have a more elaborate security framework. The inclusion of India and Pakistan as full members in 2017 has been equally puzzling for some Western observers, who felt SCO willingly created barriers to its growth.
The inclusion of India was squarely questioned on the grounds of its comfortable relations with the West and severe discontent with China. It was only on some serious prodding of Russia in 2015 that SCO moved in this direction but not without getting Pakistan also in. This mutual distrust and raging conflicts among almost all nine members have deeply scrutinized SCO. RAND organisation in an opinion piece of July 2017 highlighted that “Beijing may not have even wanted India to join the SCO”. It was felt China views India’s inclusion to contain its growing influence within the organisation, a space Russia is vying for itself. Such reasonings against the SCO functioning will be a very simplistic argument though, to suit some Western perspectives.
India’s Commitments
There is no denying that SCO has challenges with conflicting security and geopolitical interests at stake; but also, are the facts that it commands 20% of global GDP, it’s home to almost half of humanity, a confederation of four nuclear powers, it’s the single most important organisation which has a non-European character and most importantly geographically, historically and traditionally are connected. India has remained connected with SCO since 2005 as an observer and has continued a constructive approach to the broader developmental agendas benefitting the region. India has worked hard to push for its geopolitical interest in the Central Asian and Eurasian regions. The forums like SCO fully complement India’s efforts.
India has held constructive outreach for direct connectivity with the strategic Eurasian region. The 7,200-km long International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), connecting India with Russia and Iran, the three key SCO members through sea, road, and rail links was agreed upon in September 2002. In 2015 India heavily invested in Chabahar Port in Iran to gain direct connectivity with Eurasia. India connected the strategic Chabahar Port by investing US$3 billion in 218 Km long Zalrang-Delaram highway with Afghanistan. India joined the Ashgabat Agreement in 2018 to facilitate the 928-km Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran (KTI) railway line running east of the Caspian Sea. India may have been a late starter for SCO but given its historical and geostrategic interests, the region has always been at the heart of India’s worldview.
Setting Course
Since 2017 onwards after gaining the permanent membership, India has been regularly represented at the highest level. In each of the deliberations of Heads of State Council India has played a constructive role in shaping the course of the organisation. India sought to address tangible issues viz. connectivity without violation of the sovereignty, cooperation and coordination to fight against cross-border terrorism & radicalism, road map for Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled peace process in Afghanistan. India also pushed SCO to focus on economic well-being for its more than 3 billion population, as it proposed connecting young entrepreneurs & startups, reliable, resilient & diversified supply chains, and full rights to transit for trade & commerce.
Despite the fears to the contrary by China watchers, India has continued positive interaction in identifying critical challenges facing Central Asi. It has also proactively contributed towards identifying workable solutions. India set aside its frozen relations with Pakistan to invite the Pakistani Foreign Minister to the Goa Summit in January 2023 during its SCO Presidency. These are reflections of India’s matured foreign policy where it understands the geopolitical intricacies and looks prepared to manage its differences for the larger good. Complexities are immense and the dynamics are challenging, India is well conversant that working the way through requires even contrarian views to be accounted for, and being part of the SCO offers just that.
