The Red Sea crisis has evolved from a regional security concern into a global maritime disruption with direct consequences for India. Escalating Houthi attacks, great-power naval deployments, and rerouted trade flows are reshaping this critical sea lane. For India, the turmoil tests maritime resilience, energy security, and naval posture across an increasingly contested Indian Ocean region.
LT CDR NITIKA RAI (R)
FORMER INDIAN NAVY OFFICER | FOR NEWS ANALYTICS
4 mins read.
The Red Sea connects the Indian Ocean South to the Mediterranean Sea North through the Suez Canal, which is one of the world’s most important shipping routes. Nearly 12–14% of global trade and approximately 30% of container shipping pass through it. The Red Sea now faces serious disruptions to navigation and trade due to escalating hostilities, primarily driven by Yemen’s Houthi rebels. These attacks pose significant challenges not only for global commerce but also for countries like India, whose economic and strategic interests hinge on the stability of these sea lanes.
At the heart of the current crisis lies the intensification of maritime attacks by Yemen’s Houthi movement. Since late 2023, the Houthis have targeted commercial vessels transiting the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the southern Red Sea using drones, anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. These actions are publicly justified as retaliation against Israel and its allies in the wake of the Gaza conflict, but their operational impact extends far beyond Israel-linked shipping.
The attacks represent a classic case of regional conflict spillover, where land-based hostilities manifest in the maritime domain. Yemen’s prolonged civil war, unresolved political fragmentation, and external interference have turned the Red Sea littoral into fertile ground for asymmetric warfare at sea.
What began as a regional proxy conflict has transformed the Red Sea into a frontline where non-state actors now shape global trade and maritime security.
PROXY WARFARE
The crisis cannot be divorced from the wider geopolitical contest in West Asia. The Houthis are widely perceived as part of Iran’s broader “axis of resistance”,
alongside Hezbollah and allied militias in Iraq and Syria. Through relatively low-cost maritime attacks, Iran and its proxies can impose disproportionate economic and strategic costs on global trade while avoiding direct confrontation with major powers. For regional states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, the instability threatens economic interests, coastal security, and long-term development plans. Egypt, in particular, faces declining Suez Canal revenues as shipping traffic diverts away from the Red Sea.
In response, the United States and its allies launched multinational naval initiatives, most notably Operation Prosperity Guardian, aimed at safeguarding freedom of navigation. European navies, regional partners, and independent deployers have increased patrols, escort missions, and air defence coverage in the Red Sea. However, these responses have not fully restored confidence among commercial shipping companies, many of which continue to avoid the region due to insurance costs and risk assessments.
SHIPPING AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY
An often overlooked but critical actor is the global shipping and insurance industry. Decisions by major shipping lines to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope have reshaped trade flows, increased costs, and amplified the crisis’s economic impact—effects felt acutely by trading nations like India.
Militarisation of a Commercial Sea Lane: The Red Sea has witnessed rapid militarisation, with warships, drones, and missile systems operating alongside commercial traffic. This convergence of civilian and military maritime activity increases the risk of miscalculation, escalation, and accidental incidents.
Rerouting and Supply Chain Disruption: Faced with persistent threats, many shipping companies have opted to bypass the Red Sea entirely. The alternative route around southern Africa adds 10–14 days to voyages, increases fuel consumption, and strains global supply chains already weakened by geopolitical shocks and post-pandemic adjustments. Freight rates and insurance premiums have surged, creating inflationary pressures that ripple across global markets.
The militarisation of a commercial sea lane has blurred the line between civilian trade and warfare, increasing miscalculation risks and global economic vulnerability.
STRATEGIC FALLOUT FOR INDIA
India’s external trade is heavily dependent on maritime routes, with a significant share of exports and imports to Europe, North Africa, and the eastern seaboard of the Americas transiting the Red Sea. Disruptions have resulted in:
• Longer transit times for Indian exports, reducing competitiveness in time-sensitive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, textiles, and perishables.
• Higher freight and insurance costs, squeezing profit margins for exporters and increasing import bills.
• Logistical uncertainty for Indian companies integrated into global value chains.
For an economy seeking to expand manufacturing and exports under initiatives like Make in India, sustained instability in a key trade corridor poses serious challenges. India imports over 80 per cent of its crude oil requirements, much of which originates from West Asia and Africa, with a substantial volume traditionally transiting the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. While India has diversified its energy sup pliers in recent years, disruptions in the Red Sea increase transportation costs for oil and LNG shipments, heighten exposure to price volatility in global energy markets, and complicate long-term energy planning and strategic reserve management.
In a worst-case scenario, prolonged instability could force India to rely more heavily on longer, costlier routes, undermining energy affordability and economic stability. The Red Sea crisis has underscored the growing expectations placed on the Indian Navy as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region. While India is not a direct participant in Western-led operations in the Red Sea, it has:
• Increased naval deployments in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
• Conducted escort missions for Indian-flagged vessels.
• Enhanced maritime domain awareness through surveillance and intelligence sharing.
These actions reflect India’s cautious but proactive approach—protecting national interests without becoming entangled in extra-regional conflicts. However, sustained instability raises questions about resource allocation, operational overstretch, and the balance between regional commitments and blue-water ambitions. The crisis highlights the vulnerability of India’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), not only in the Red Sea but across interconnected chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait. It reinforces several strategic realities:
• Maritime chokepoints remain the Achilles’ heel of globalisation.
• Non-state actors can exert strategic leverage disproportionate to their conventional power.
• India’s economic rise is inseparable from maritime security beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
For India, the Red Sea turmoil serves as a reminder that security in the Western Indian Ocean is as critical as developments closer to home.
India’s response reflects cautious assertiveness— protecting maritime interests while avoiding entanglement in extra-regional conflicts that could erode strategic autonomy.
STRENGTHENING MARITIME DIPLOMACY
India must continue engaging with regional states, extra-regional powers, and multilateral forums to promote de-escalation and cooperative maritime security. Diplomatic outreach to the Gulf, East Africa, and key stakeholders in
West Asia remains essential.
Rather than ad hoc responses, India could invest in sustained forward presence, interoperability with partner navies, and capacity-building initiatives for littoral states. This would reinforce India’s credibility as a stabilising force without direct military entanglement. Reducing over-dependence on single routes is critical. Initiatives such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), diversified sourcing, and strategic stockpiling can cushion the economic impact of maritime disruptions.
The “fire” in the Red Sea is not an isolated blaze but part of a broader pattern of geopolitical volatility reshaping the global maritime order. For India, the crisis is both a warning and an opportunity—a warning about the fragility of the maritime foundations underpinning economic growth, and an opportunity to refine its role as a responsible maritime power.
Safeguarding trade, ensuring energy security, and maintainingstrategic autonomy will require India to blend naval capability with diplomacy, resilience with adaptability. As the Red Sea continues to simmer, India’s response will offer valuable insights into how emerging powers navigate an increasingly contested maritime world.
(Lt Cdr Nitika Rai (R), former Indian Navy Officer and Senior Consultant, Ernst & Young. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
The News Analytics Herald.)
QUICK INSIGHTS
• Sustained Houthi maritime attacks have disrupted a vital global trade corridor linking Asia, Europe, and Africa.
• Shipping reroutes via longer passages are driving up costs, transit times, and pressure on global supply chains.
• India’s trade flows and energy imports face heightened vulnerability due to prolonged instability in the Red Sea.
• The crisis raises expectations of India’s role as a stabilising maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean region.
• Enduring resilience will depend on calibrated diplomacy, enhanced naval preparedness, and diversified trade and energy routes.
