Riyadh’s embrace of Islamabad through a defence pact is being hailed in Pakistan as a triumph, yet it may prove a hollow shield. For India, the move underscores the dangers of Gulf power projection into South Asia. Will Saudi Arabia truly risk its crown jewels for Pakistan, or is this merely a diplomatic mirage?
The News Analytics Herald Editorial Desk
a 5 mins read.
On 17 September 2025, a smiling photo op of Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was flashed from Al Yamamah Palace in Riyadh to the world. The glee on Sharif’s face was unmistakable. It was one of the most prized achievements that he held in his hand in his entire political career. A security assurance from the Saudis was almost a dream-come-true moment for Pakistan, rattled with economic misery and bloated with security dogma. On a visit to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the hosts agreed to a mutual defence treaty termed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement.
As per the information available, the treaty binds both signatories into a mutual security assurance, going as far as committing them to treat “an act of aggression against one as an act against both”. Significantly, the understanding seems to have been borrowed from NATO’s Article 5 of the collective security guarantee. How strongly it gels in this context remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the immediate attention was drawn to Delhi and Tel Aviv, suggestively two neighbours in relatively hostile relations with the protagonists Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, respectively.
A Saudi guarantee thrilled Pakistan, but in Delhi and Tel Aviv, the move was watched warily, raising questions of intent and balance.
DELHI AND TEL AVIV
While Delhi tried to be seen as not much impressed with the development, commenting, “it had the information and the deal has now only been formalised,” Tel Aviv was more upfront, terming it as having nothing to do with the deal, as Israel and Saudi Arabia have never fought a war. So the question is, who was this security arrangement directed against or conversely, which party gets the better part of the bargain?
It hardly took any time before the Pakistani defence minister came bragging on TV that they had a security guarantee against India from the Saudis. He thundered that the Saudis would fully commit to protecting Pakistan in case of hostilities with India! Interestingly, there was a studied silence from Riyadh. The Pakistani state was drawing true parallels with someone drowning mid-sea, getting ecstatic with a floating straw. Dawn, one of Pakistan’s leading newspapers, commented on it as a ‘diplomatic and geopolitical victory’.
MIXED SAUDI SIGNALS
However, amidst the celebratory notes being exchanged in the Pakistani media, a dampener was issued by the Saudi Shura’s chief that “the treaty is not against any country”. Importantly, this statement was made by Dr Abdullah ibn Muhammad Al ash-Sheikh, Speaker of the Consultative Assembly or Majlis ash-Shura, during his visit to Islamabad. It was a counter-narrative to Mr Khawaja Asif’s hawkish interpretation earlier and was clearly seen as an attempt to de-link it from the India–Pakistan calculus.
It was certainly important coming from a man of his stature. In Saudi Arabia, the Majlis ash-Shura plays a key advisory role to the King for national functioning, and its chief is considered to have the ear of the highest authority in the land. He was also seen to be carrying a direct message from the Kingdom to contextualise the new defence treaty and not let it harm relations with another nation.
Saudi leaders quickly clarified: the treaty was not against any country, tempering Islamabad’s triumphal claims with diplomatic caution.
DOHA STRIKE SHOCK
Since the Hamas onslaught on Israel on 7 October 2023, the Middle East continues to be a global hot kettle. The outbreak of hostilities has subsumed many regional actors, creating multi-dimensional sub-conflicts as an uncontrolled extension from the Palestinian shore. The Middle East has been a paradox in a way: while the region has been blessed with an abundance of global bio-resources, its ideological differences have extracted a tremendous cost.
The Gaza conflict, now in its third year, has seen Israel confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, and established regimes in Syria and Iran. The region has been sitting on the edge of implosion, witnessing massive missile and aerial assaults on Iran and its retaliation on Israel. The US, for the first time since 1988, directly confronted Iran by bombing its suspected nuclear sites on 22 June 2025, drawing sharp retaliation from Iran, which attacked a US base in Qatar. When it just seemed to spiral out of hand into a major regional war directly involving Israel and Iran, the actors backed off from the brink.
However, the direct Israeli attack on Doha on 9 September 2025 made the strategic calculation flip upside down. Qatar, a country that has been known to play an active mediation role during regional conflicts and has successfully maintained strong working relations with almost all regional capitals, was considered a neutral and safe ally by many. It hosted the largest US base in the region with some of the most advanced military hardware stationed 365 days a year. This made a direct attack almost a no-go; the myth was shattered by Israel when it announced a selective strike in a Doha neighbourhood targeting Hamas negotiators.
The Middle East was not anticipating any such possibility to be strategically realistic, even though there were chances of tactical gains. The presence of US bases in a country has long been considered strong insurance by the host against being attacked by adversaries. The precedent is immeasurable at present, especially when there are suggestions that the US had prior information and still green-lighted the Israeli operation. The fact is, Qatar was attacked. In a global geostrategic calculation, this is a poorly analysed operation that has tremendous pitfalls, while the suggested gains remain minuscule. Analysts will tell you that the implied US complicity in not giving a heads-up to Qatar was a gross breach of trust.
This is a geopolitical blunder and adds to the long list of such brazen acts from the current administration. The US has already lost much of its trust capital owing to its tariff overreach; this loss of trust in a strategic dimension is unprecedented. The Israeli strike in the Qatari capital has ripple effects in the region. Long-time US allies in the region and beyond are deeply worried over this development and have questioned the US commitment towards their own security. Responding to this goof-up, the US initially tried downplaying the act, but a strong undercurrent ultimately forced it to draw an ‘apology’ from the Israeli PM.
TREATY IN PERSPECTIVE
The developments have caused a sense of unease in the Middle East, instigating a reassessment of security dynamics and the balance of power. The timing of this new defence treaty is suspected to be a clear fallout of the same. The defence treaty between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has been discussed and shaped over the last few years. Both parties have hedged their strategic interests: while Saudi Arabia gets a Muslim nuclear power on its side, Pakistan gets a strong regional ally with a dollar bank! Understandably, the greenbacks make everyone delighted in Pakistan. But two obvious issues stand out for scrutiny – firstly, will Saudi Arabia play an ‘active role’ for Pakistan in an India–Pakistan conflict scenario, as Pakistan is trumpeting; secondly, will Pakistan offer its nuclear assets if Saudi Arabia feels threatened?
Let’s analyse each of these two most pertinent issues. As far as Saudi Arabia’s role in a subcontinent scenario is concerned, the treaty restricts support to Pakistan only in case it is subjected to an ‘act of aggression’; it is not an automated response in a conflict scenario involving Pakistan with anyone, including, say, India. In case Pakistan fails to convince the Kingdom that it has been subjected to ‘an act of aggression’, it will have to continue to fight a solo war.
Now, think of this treaty as existing during the pre-1999 period. General Musharraf wouldn’t have dared to initiate the Kargil War, sending Northern Light Infantry soldiers to icy heights to grab Indian territory and making Pakistan ‘commit the act of aggression’. In a way, this treaty binds Pakistan in knots now; the freewheeling Rawalpindi Headquarters would need to convince the Kingdom before undertaking fanciful operations in the future.
The Saudi–Pakistani treaty looks powerful on paper, but military realities make it optics more than substance — money, not missiles, will define this bargain.
Now comes the second part of Pakistan’s support to Saudi Arabia during the conflict. Will Pakistan move its forces to fight alongside Saudi troops? The answer is highly debatable. Not because of willingness but because of sheer operational impracticality. Pakistan needs its military to deploy on the northern and eastern borders with Afghanistan and India. The western theatre situation in Baluchistan isn’t good either. The operational intensity can be increased at any time by its adversaries on the borders and LoC, completely tying up its forces or at least making large-scale deployment towards a foreign territory absolutely out of the question.
Saudi Arabia isn’t even a neighbour of Pakistan; it is separated by more than 2,500 km. Considering a hypothetical scenario, say Saudi Arabia’s hostilities with Tel Aviv. Pakistan doesn’t even have a weapon to reach that far. Israel stands more than 3,000 km from Pakistan, and Pakistan’s longest-range missile, Shaheen III, has a claimed range of only 2,750 km. In short, a basic military assessment tells us Pakistan can neither commit troops nor send a missile to help its new ally, and for sure, the Kingdom is unlikely to turn to Pakistan for dollars to finance its future wars!
The treaty appears more of an exercise in creating optics while practically delivering nothing. Surely, Pakistan can hope to get itself bankrolled at the time of crisis, but then its history is filled with sell-outs to foreign powers. Pakistan has always been on sale to the highest bidder. This time, it is not the Chinese or the Americans, but the Kingdom that has pitched in with a higher call!
Key Takeaways
- Saudi–Pakistani defence pact projected as historic, yet its actual strategic substance remains deeply questionable.
- Islamabad celebrates the “security guarantee,” while Riyadh issues cautious clarifications to de-link India–Pakistan tensions.
- India and Israel watch closely, wary of Gulf power projection altering South Asia’s fragile balance.
- Israeli strike on Doha shakes trust, forcing reassessment of regional security dynamics and American reliability.
- Treaty largely optics-driven, offering Pakistan prestige but unlikely to deliver credible, practical military support.
