India’s evolving Myanmar policy demands pragmatism, strategic foresight and regional necessity. With Myanmar facing political turmoil post-2021 coup, India balances diplomatic restraint, border security and economic interests while navigating regional instability influenced by China and Bangladesh. As insurgencies grow and humanitarian crises spill across borders, India’s engagement blends soft power, defense cooperation and connectivity projects to secure its Northeast, counter China’s influence and bolster its Act East vision.
BY LT GEN A B SHIVANE (RETD), FOR NEWS ANALYTICS
a 5 mins read.
India and Myanmar share a geographical, cultural, and economic relationship based on their shared history and Buddhist affinity. Both nations were closely intertwined under British rule. Post-independence, the relationship had its ups and downs due to differing models of government and military coups in Myanmar. However, the 2021 coup, the junta’s weakening control and the surge of resistance movements have rendered much of Myanmar’s periphery unstable. While the Western democracies condemned and imposed sanctions, India chose a path of restraint and diplomacy rooted in geography, internal security, hedging China and its Act East policy. Thus, India’s Myanmar policy is not about choosing between ideals and interests but managing contradictions to further its national interests.
The relationship between India and Myanmar faced challenges with India recalibrating its border management strategy and border fencing post-Manipur ethnic conflicts, refugee influx and the threat of Chinese support to ethnic insurgent groups. The military junta’s brutal operations have forced thousands of refugees to flee and triggered a humanitarian disaster. Integrated in this matrix is Bangladesh, with the Rohingya crisis spilling both Bangladesh and India. Thus, it needs a trilateral approach to refugee repatriation, border management and regional development.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF MYANMAR TO INDIA
India shares a long land border of 1643 km with Myanmar, as well as a 725 km maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal with India. Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram share a boundary with Myanmar. It is the only ASEAN country adjoining India and, therefore, is a gateway to South East Asia. It acts as a land and maritime bridge between South and Southeast Asia. Thus, Myanmar remains central to India’s ‘Act East and ‘Neighbourhood First’ Policies. India also plays up its soft power with shared spiritual, historical, linguistic and ethnic ties with Myanmar.
Myanmar’s strategic location allows it to counterbalance Chinese regional influence by developing a secondary maritime route to avoid the Malacca Strait. India thus pushes for defence cooperation, joint military exercises and maritime ties under its SAGAR ( Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision.
India is the fifth-largest trading partner of Myanmar. However, not commensurate with the potential. It pursues its trade interests through joint development projects such as the Sittwe Port and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. Bilateral trade ties are pursued under the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) and India’s Duty-Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) scheme. Another area of interest is Myanmar’s energy sector and offshore gas potential. India’s investments in the Shwe Gas pipeline project demonstrate the bilateral economic partnership.
On the internal security front, India’s NE region faces persistent threats which originate from Myanmar. ULFA-I, NSCN-K and NDFB-S use Myanmar’s territory as bases to launch operations against the Indian forces from across the border. Drug trafficking throughout the Golden Triangle region has become more active in recent 
months. Arms and narcotics supply from Myanmar to Manipur contributed to the May 2023 ethnic violence, which created security risks that became evident through the April 2024 $418,000 heroin seizure. India’s strategic interest desires a stable and friendly Myanmar, while both the Rohingya crisis and the recent deterioration of relations with Bangladesh remain challenges.
India must secure key connectivity projects like the Kaladan and Trilateral Highway that traverse insurgent-controlled zones while reinforcing border management against arms and refugee inflows.
REALPOLITIK AND RECONCILIATION
India’s Myanmar policy has been one of “pragmatic engagement”, balancing democracy and diplomacy, shaped by the lens of security, economic, and geopolitical imperatives. From fostering economic ties to building trust in defence, Indo-Myanmar relations epitomise the interplay of soft and hard power in diplomacy. India’s policy remains deft, adaptive, and regionally integrated, particularly as Myanmar’s conflict spills over into neighbouring Bangladesh, whose regime change has added new dimensions and complicated the regional geopolitical calculus.
India’s policy is also driven by the China Factor and the need for hedging. China’s investment from defence to ports to SEZ has captured immense space in Myanmar. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor gives Beijing direct access to the Bay of Bengal. Thus, India is driven by competition, not confrontation, in this strategy to contain Chinese influence. It is here that Indian projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, together with the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, play critical roles in India’s “Act East” policy to enhance trade and enhance its influence. India has allotted a grant of $250,000 for fast-impact projects for the social-economic development of Myanmar, including agriculture, education and disaster management. However, the biggest challenge to India’s projects, particularly 
the connectivity, lies in their security as they pass through insurgent-controlled, volatile areas. Thus, last year at the ASEAN-India Summit, the Indian PM emphasised ASEAN’s “five-point consensus” which includes an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties; the appointment of a special envoy; humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and the special envoy’s visit to Myanmar to meet with all parties.
THE CHINA FACTOR
China is the most influential power in Myanmar. China’s growing strategic footprints in Myanmar reflect Beijing’s willingness to create economic dependency and secure strategic depth in the Indian Ocean. China was among the few countries post the 2021 Myanmar coup and was one of the first to recognise the military regime. Yet while it engages with the junta, its stance towards the proposed 2025 elections has been ambiguous, fearing a political reset.
The Chinese government maintains a strategic presence in Myanmar through which it safeguards BRI infrastructure, particularly Kyaukphyu port, yet refrains from excessive involvement in Myanmar’s fragile political landscape. The deterioration of border security, exacerbated by the Operation 1027 offensive launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, has, however, impeded trade and threatened Chinese interests.
Diplomatically, China continues to engage the junta but remains cautious. It has not backed the National Unity Government (NUG) but maintains backchannel communications with resistance forces. Beijing’s approach reflects a preference for preserving leverage over all actors rather than backing any one side. Stability, not loyalty, remains China’s strategy to safeguard its long-term influence.
China’s military assistance, especially the sale of jet trainers, UAS, and spare parts, has continued unabated since the coup, despite a surfeit of evidence that these military materials are used to intentionally target civilians. Nonetheless, even as China bolsters the regime’s military capabilities while curbing the opposition’s drone warfare, these measures are unlikely to turn the tide of the conflict.
A NEW VECTOR OF INSTABILITY
India’s strategic calculus must integrate the growing tensions that exist between Myanmar and Bangladesh due to the ongoing Rohingya crisis, impacting both India and Bangladesh, leading to regional instability. The Myanmar instability post-coup and political changes in Dhaka following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in 2024 have created new uncertainties and challenges to these relationships.
India needs stable relations with both Myanmar and Bangladesh. India’s Act East policy requires Myanmar as a land connection to Southeast Asia, while Bangladesh enables India access to the Bay of Bengal through their role in the ‘Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation’ (BIMSTEC) and the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) multimodal corridor programs.
China’s dual engagement with Myanmar’s junta and resistance forces, coupled with growing influence in Bangladesh, complicates India’s regional calculus and demands a calibrated strategic counterbalance.
PROACTIVE ENGAGEMENT
India must now broaden its strategic aperture. The triangulated dynamics between Myanmar, Bangladesh, and China are reshaping regional geopolitics. Insurgencies, refugee flows, narcotics, and proxy conflicts are converging at India’s doorstep, which requires it to recalibrate its border management and upscale its vigilance.
China’s deepening footprint in Bangladesh through the BRI and its hedged engagement with both the junta and resistance groups in Myanmar are forcing India to recalibrate. The risk of being strategically challenged via ports, roads, and political influence is a reality. India must expedite the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multimodal Project while ensuring their safety in insurgent-controlled, volatile areas. Simultaneously, India needs to counter China’s influence through targeted investments, capacity-building, and strategic messaging.
India’s Myanmar policy must be one of proactive strategic engagement and strategic influence, keeping dialogue open with the junta while supporting calls for democratic transition. In the interest of its Southeast Asia and Act East policy, it has a stake in ensuring that Myanmar is less repressive of its ethnic communities and more open to political compromise. Myanmar may be in crisis, but India’s response must reflect strategic clarity, not strategic haste, with a long-term perspective for furtherance of its national interest.
(Lt Gen A B Shivane (Retd), Former DG Mechanised Forces, Indian Army. TEDx Speaker, Strategic Defence Consultant, Analyst & Corporate Mentor. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Journal.)
Major Highlights
- Myanmar’s location makes it vital to India’s Act East and Neighbourhood First policies, especially for Northeast connectivity.
- Insurgency, refugee crises, and drug trafficking through Myanmar threaten India’s internal security, demanding vigilant border management.
- India faces growing competition from China’s economic and military entrenchment in Myanmar and Bangladesh.
- India’s Myanmar strategy walks a tightrope between democratic ideals, regional stability, and realpolitik.
- India must proactively engage with all stakeholders, fast-track regional projects, and align humanitarian concerns with national interests.
