Russia under its updated nuclear doctrine, titled “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” asserts the right to employ nuclear weapons not only in retaliation to a nuclear strike but also in response to a conventional weapons attack that poses a “critical threat” to its sovereignty, territorial integrity, or that of its ally, Belarus. In contrast, the earlier doctrine from 2020 permitted the use of nuclear weapons only if an attack endangered “the very existence of the state.”
AMBASSADOR ANIL WADHWA, IFS (RETD)
FOR THE NEWS ANALYTICS JOURNAL
a 4 mins read.
Russia announced on November 19, 2024, that the Russian government’s policy on the use of nuclear weapons had been updated. The document outlines a wide range of contingencies that might trigger nuclear weapons use, especially regarding non-nuclear weapons threats to Russia and its allies, and has lowered the threshold for nuclear use. The update of the Russian nuclear doctrine was previewed by President Putin in comments on September 25, 2024, just days after it was reported that US President Joe Biden had decided to authorise Ukraine’s use of US-supplied long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) to strike targets deeper into Russia as a means of thwarting ongoing Russian attacks on Ukrainian territory. Russia had warned that such a move would change the nature of the conflict.
Under the revised nuclear doctrine, titled “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons not only in a response to a nuclear attack, but also to respond to a conventional weapons attack that creates a “critical threat” to its “sovereignty, and territorial integrity” or to that of Russian ally, Belarus. The previous version of Russian nuclear weapons doctrine issued in 2020, reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if an attack on Russia threatens “the very existence of the state”.
President Putin proposed treating aggression by non-nuclear states, supported by nuclear powers, against Russia or its allies as a joint attack, potentially deterring Western military aid to Ukraine.
REVISED POLICY
The revised policy also states that Russia may use nuclear weapons in the event there is “reliable information on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and /or its allies or “the use by the enemy of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction on the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies, on military formations and/ or facilities of the Russian Federation located outside its territory”. Another scenario involves a response to the “receipt of reliable information on the massive launch (take off) of aerospace attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned hypersonic and other aircraft) and their crossing of the “state border of the Russian Federation”.
The catalogue of what Russia considers military dangers which will evoke a military response includes the expansion of military coalitions and proximity of their infrastructure to Russian borders, actions aimed at isolating Russian territory by blocking vital transport links, attacks on ecologically hazardous sites that could lead to manmade disasters and large-scale military exercises near Russian borders. The addition of ‘anti-satellite warfare’ to an existing provision on the militarisation of outer space is interesting, considering US alarm over potential Russian nuclear-capable anti-satellite weapons as well as Moscow’s expressed concern about US programmes related to these capabilities. As the conflict on the ground in Ukraine has escalated, so have Russian nuclear threats. Russia has conducted military drills with Belarus involving tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally, it withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 2023 and has also announced last month that it is fully ready to resume testing if necessary.
In his 24th September 2024 pronouncement, President Putin had already suggested the new provision that aggression against Russia and/or its allies by any non-nuclear state with participation or support from a nuclear state will be considered a joint attack. This appears designed to deter Western military aid to Ukraine by framing such support as a potential justification for nuclear escalation. Yet, despite this warning, on 17th November the US approved the Ukrainian request for authorisation to use ATACMS missiles outside its own borders, and shortly thereafter, the UK and France followed suit in lifting restrictions on Ukrainian use of Storm Shadow missiles on targets inside Russia.
UNINTENDED ESCALATION
After Biden’s approval, Ukraine fired a bunch of ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles into Russia. With a countdown of less than two months before an incoming Trump administration, the Biden administration is essentially signaling to Ukraine that it will support its efforts to retain the small portion of Russian territory it holds, to use it as a significant bargaining chip in future potential negotiations. Following this, Russia retaliated by launching a nuclear-capable experimental ballistic missile “Oreshnik” with a range of several thousand kilometers against the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. This signaled a warning to Ukraine’s allies: a broader conflict may loom unless the West adjusts its policy.
Despite Russia’s readiness to escalate through advanced weaponry, Russia’s decision to notify the US Defence Threat Reduction Agency, only 30 minutes prior, was clearly aimed at preventing misinterpretation and mitigating the risk of immediate nuclear escalation. This reflects Russia’s recognition of the dangers of miscalculation and unintended escalation, highlighting the intent to avoid inadvertently triggering a nuclear war.
The possibility of escalation with the use of low-yield nuclear weapons on the battlefield has not been ruled out by Russia. Although unlikely, such a decision might come as a nuclear warning shot over a remote area in Ukraine if Russia perceives an imminent threat to it, or as stated in the revised doctrine, the “sovereignty/ territorial integrity of Russia or Belarus” is at stake. Russia has thus created a calculated spectrum of potential nuclear responses that forces adversaries to contemplate the possibility that even actions that fall well short of threatening Russia’s existence as a state could lead to a worst-case scenario. The purpose is not only deterrence but also an attempt to divide Europe based on how much risk they are willing to take in supporting Ukraine. The changes are targeted at NATO in the context of Ukraine.
In a rare televised address, President Putin warned that the war in Ukraine has “acquired elements of a global character”. This was echoed by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who said “The threat is serious and real when it comes to the global conflict”. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has said that “never before’ has the threat of a nuclear war been greater, blaming the US for its “aggressive and hostile’ policy towards North Korea.
The existence of nuclear weapons perpetuates the risk of catastrophic war, where mistakes could escalate rapidly, posing strategic dilemmas for Russian adversaries in rare nuclear-use scenarios.
RUSSIAN RED LINES
US President-elect Donald Trump will officially enter the White House on 20th January 2025. While on the campaign trail, President-elect Trump vowed to end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours”. Those around him like Vice President-elect JD Vance, have signaled that this will mean compromises for Ukraine, likely in the form of giving up territory in the Donbas and Crimea. That goes against the stance of the Biden administration, whose latest decisions point to a desire to get as much aid through the door as possible before President-elect Trump enters office.
The kinds of weapons now provided to Ukraine – such as artillery, main battle tanks, ATACMS missile systems, and F-16 fighters – are far more sophisticated than the weapons provided to Ukraine prior to 2022. Russian red lines are being crossed repeatedly, even though these may be incremental. The ATACMs whose use was authorised by the US, France and UK have their telemetry controlled by NATO, and they were limited in numbers with a predetermined range. However, as long as nuclear weapons exist, so does the risk of nuclear war. Mistakes can quickly lead to escalation, resulting in a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Russian strategic adversaries will face a dilemma in the unlikely scenario of the use of nuclear weapons. Disregarding a hypothetical strike will increase insecurity while trying to destroy Russia’s nuclear arsenal will certainly lead to an all-out nuclear war. Silence or ambivalence risks normalising this reckless behavior.
(Ambassador Anil Wadhwa, IFS (R) has served as Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs and is former Ambassador to Italy, Oman, Thailand, Poland, Lithuania and San Marino. He is currently a Distinguished Fellow with the Vivekananda International Foundation and serves on some corporate Boards in India and abroad. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Journal.)
