As Washington revives hemispheric primacy and Europe pursues strategic autonomy, the international order is fragmenting into competing centres of influence, transactional alliances and increasingly contested geopolitical realities.
By Ambassador Srikumar Menon, IFS(R) | For The News Analytics Herald
3 mins read.
The contemporary international order is undergoing significant strategic transformation. For nearly eight decades, the transatlantic alliance formed the institutional and political foundation of the Western-led order, sustained by collective security, democratic values and multilateral cooperation.
Recent changes in United States foreign policy, particularly under the “America First” doctrine, have altered this relationship. Greater emphasis on unilateral action, economic nationalism and regional primacy has weakened the consultative approach traditionally underpinning transatlantic cooperation.
Central to this shift is Washington’s renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere through a modern reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The objective is increasingly clear: counter extra-regional influence, strengthen homeland security and reaffirm American strategic primacy across the Americas. The consequences extend beyond the hemisphere, affecting relations with Europe, Latin American alignments and the emerging global balance of power.
HEMISPHERIC REVIVAL
The Monroe Doctrine, announced by President James Monroe in 1823, warned European powers against intervention in the Western Hemisphere. The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 subsequently expanded this principle, asserting an American right to intervene in neighbouring states to protect U.S. interests and regional stability.
Contemporary American strategy echoes this logic by placing homeland and hemispheric security at the centre of national strategy. Migration, transnational crime and growing Chinese and Russian influence are increasingly treated as strategic challenges requiring stronger American regional influence.
Unlike earlier administrations that sought to balance regional leadership with multilateral engagement, the Trump administration has relied more heavily on diplomatic, economic and coercive instruments. Concerns over the Panama Canal, Chinese investment in strategic infrastructure and Russian security relationships illustrate Washington’s determination to limit external powers within its immediate neighbourhood.
The revival of the Monroe Doctrine signals not simply a return to history, but a redefinition of American strategic priorities.
TRANSATLANTIC STRAINS
This hemispheric assertiveness accompanies a broader transformation in America’s relationship with Europe. Since the Second World War, U.S. leadership rested substantially on consultation with allies and support for multilateral institutions. Increasingly, that approach has become more transactional.
Three developments illustrate the change.
First, strategic priorities are diverging. European governments broadly remain invested in institutional cooperation, while Washington increasingly emphasises burden-sharing, sovereignty and geopolitical competition. Repeated demands for higher NATO defence spending and questions surrounding the extent of American security guarantees have accelerated European concerns about long-term dependence.
Second, economic relations have become more contentious. Tariffs and coercive economic measures, applied against competitors and allies alike, reflect an increasingly nationalist approach to trade. Measures intended to strengthen American industry and reduce external vulnerabilities have simultaneously weakened confidence in the predictability of transatlantic economic relations.
Third, unilateral foreign-policy actions have intensified concerns over alliance management. Disagreements surrounding Greenland, Venezuela and wider questions of territorial and strategic influence have reinforced European perceptions that Washington is increasingly willing to privilege coercive statecraft over collective decision-making. The result is a stronger European debate over strategic autonomy.
REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS
America’s renewed focus on hemispheric dominance is also reshaping Latin American geopolitics. China has significantly expanded its economic presence through infrastructure, energy, telecommunications and mining investments, including projects associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia has maintained political and security relationships with governments including Venezuela and cultivated defence cooperation elsewhere.
These developments challenge traditional American primacy in its immediate strategic neighbourhood. Washington’s response has produced mixed reactions. Some Latin American governments welcome stronger cooperation against organised crime, narcotics trafficking and security threats. Others regard renewed American assertiveness as reminiscent of historical interventionism.
Consequently, many governments increasingly favour multi-alignment. Rather than choosing exclusively between Washington and Beijing, they seek productive relationships with several major powers, maximising economic opportunity while retaining diplomatic flexibility.
Latin America is increasingly choosing strategic flexibility over exclusive alignment, reshaping the geopolitics of the Western Hemisphere.
EUROPE REPOSITIONS
Uncertainty surrounding American policy has accelerated Europe’s efforts to strengthen its own capabilities. NATO remains central to European security, but governments are investing more heavily in defence, industrial resilience and independent diplomatic capacity.
Europe is simultaneously diversifying economic relationships beyond the United States. Its expanding engagement with Latin America, including the EU-Mercosur framework, reflects an effort to strengthen commercial and political options in an increasingly competitive environment.
Strategic autonomy does not necessarily mean separation from Washington. Rather, it represents an attempt to reduce excessive dependence while preserving the transatlantic relationship. The result could eventually be a more balanced alliance in which Europe assumes greater responsibility for its security while exercising greater diplomatic independence.
EMERGING WORLD ORDER
These developments are accelerating the transition from the post-Cold War order towards a more fragmented international system. From a realist perspective, America’s renewed hemispheric emphasis can be understood as an attempt to consolidate its strategic neighbourhood before concentrating greater resources on long-term competition with China. Securing the Western Hemisphere could strengthen Washington’s position in the wider global contest.
But unilateralism carries risks. Alienating allies, generating anti-American sentiment and weakening institutional cohesion can create opportunities for strategic competitors.
China continues expanding its economic and diplomatic influence through infrastructure investment, the Belt and Road Initiative and platforms such as BRICS. Russia uses security partnerships and political relationships to preserve influence. Meanwhile, influential middle powers—including India, Brazil, Türkiye, Indonesia and South Africa—increasingly favour flexible partnerships rather than rigid bloc alignment.
The future international order may be shaped less by permanent alliances than by adaptive coalitions, strategic autonomy and competing centres of power.
What is emerging is neither straightforward bipolarity nor necessarily stable multipolarity. Instead, the system increasingly resembles fragmented multipolarity—overlapping spheres of influence, fluid coalitions and partnerships constructed around specific interests.
This fragmentation also creates challenges for multilateral institutions. As major powers increasingly resort to unilateral action and geopolitical competition, cooperation on climate change, arms control, cyber governance, public health and non-proliferation becomes more difficult.
The larger strategic question is therefore not simply whether the United States is reviving the Monroe Doctrine. It is whether the world’s leading powers are increasingly returning to the broader logic behind it: secure the immediate neighbourhood, limit rival influence and construct spheres of strategic advantage.
If so, the transformation underway in the Western Hemisphere may represent something larger than a shift in American foreign policy. It could be an early expression of the international order now taking shape—less universal, more transactional and increasingly organised around competing centres of power, strategic autonomy and contested spheres of influence.
(Ambassador Srikumar Menon, IFS (R.), former Ambassador of India to South Sudan, Angola and Sao Tome & Principe. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Herald.)
