Many countries are watching how China expands its navy, builds overseas ports, and increases control over key sea routes. This is often called a “maritime encirclement strategy.” It is not a formal plan, but a mix of actions that expand China’s influence across major oceans.
Noel Adalia Dimasacat | Defence Analyst And East Asia Scholar | Manila, Philippines | For The News Analytics Herald
3 mins read.
Most global trade—around 80–90 per cent by volume—moves by sea, carrying energy, food, electronics and raw materials. The Indo-Pacific is particularly important because its shipping routes connect Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas.
The Strait of Malacca is among the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. China depends heavily on sea routes for energy imports from the Middle East and Africa, making disruption to these routes a significant economic and strategic vulnerability.
China has consequently focused on protecting sea lanes while rapidly expanding its naval capabilities. Its navy now possesses aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines, amphibious vessels and increasingly sophisticated warships. A formidable domestic shipbuilding industry supports this expansion.
Chinese naval operations now extend from the South and East China Seas into the Indian Ocean and waters near Africa, including anti-piracy deployments and international exercises. The underlying objective is to protect trade routes, energy supplies and overseas interests.
China’s maritime expansion is not only about naval strength but also about securing trade routes, resources and strategic influence.
STRATEGIC SEA NETWORK
China has financed and developed ports and maritime infrastructure across several countries, including Pakistan, Sri Lanka and East Africa. Some facilities have potential dual-use characteristics, supporting commercial activity while potentially providing logistical value for naval operations.
Djibouti is particularly significant because of its location near the Red Sea and routes leading towards the Suez Canal. China’s broader maritime infrastructure strategy forms part of the Maritime Silk Road, linking Asia, Africa and Europe through ports, shipping and trade corridors.
Beijing presents these projects as instruments of connectivity and development. Critics, however, question whether Chinese financing and operational involvement could create strategic dependence or expand Beijing’s geopolitical influence.
Analysts sometimes describe the combination of naval power, overseas ports, commercial routes and access to chokepoints as “maritime encirclement”, although this is not an official Chinese doctrine. The debate reflects competing interpretations of whether this network primarily protects commerce or creates wider strategic leverage.
INDO-PACIFIC CONTEST
The Indo-Pacific has become one of the world’s most contested maritime regions, where trade, military strategy, energy security and geopolitical influence increasingly intersect.
The South China Sea remains a major flashpoint. China has overlapping maritime claims with several Southeast Asian states and has developed artificial islands equipped with infrastructure including runways, ports and military facilities.
Freedom of navigation represents another source of friction. The United States conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations in contested waters, while China frequently responds with patrols and monitoring. Such encounters increase the possibility of miscalculation.
Regional military capabilities are also expanding. Japan, India, Australia and several Southeast Asian states are strengthening naval forces, surveillance capabilities and security partnerships amid broader strategic competition.
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the defining maritime arena where trade, security and great-power competition increasingly intersect.
Strategic chokepoints amplify these concerns. The Malacca, Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb straits carry significant volumes of global trade and energy. Conflict, piracy or political instability affecting these waterways could disrupt supply chains and increase energy costs worldwide.
Growing numbers of warships operating in proximity also increase the possibility of accidental escalation. Meanwhile, dependence on satellites, communications networks and digital systems introduces additional risks from cyber operations, electronic warfare and intelligence competition.
ISLAND CHAIN STRATEGY
The First Island Chain stretches broadly from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines towards Borneo, forming an important strategic geography close to China’s coastline.
For the United States and regional allies, this geography supports surveillance, military positioning and access across the western Pacific. For China, it can constrain naval access to the wider Pacific during a conflict.
Beijing has responded by developing stronger naval, submarine and missile capabilities designed partly to operate beyond its near seas. Competition surrounding the island chain has consequently become an important element of regional defence planning.
Japan and the Philippines have acquired greater strategic importance because of their positions along major maritime routes. Surveillance, exercises, defence cooperation and military access arrangements are therefore becoming increasingly significant.
The First Island Chain represents more than geography; it symbolises the strategic competition shaping future Indo-Pacific security.
FUTURE SEA ORDER
China argues that its naval development and maritime infrastructure protect trade, energy security and legitimate national interests while supporting economic development. Critics contend that expanding naval capabilities and overseas access could increase Beijing’s strategic influence and alter the maritime balance of power.
Both interpretations are shaping regional policies.
China’s maritime rise will continue to affect global commerce because economic security remains inseparable from secure sea lanes. Disruption in the Indo-Pacific could have consequences extending far beyond the region through energy prices, shipping costs and global supply chains.
Yet competition need not eliminate cooperation. Maritime safety, anti-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster response provide areas where major powers retain shared interests.
The central challenge will therefore be managing an Indo-Pacific in which economic interdependence and strategic rivalry coexist. How China, the United States and regional powers manage that tension will significantly influence the future maritime order—and, with it, the stability of global trade.
(Noel Adalia Dimasacat, is a Defence Analyst & East Asia scholar specialising in technology. He is also the Chief Technology Officer at GWT Philippines. He is the Awardee of World CIO 200-2024 & 2023 – Transformative Technology Leader. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Herald.)
