19/10/2025

BALTIC STATES BRACE AGAINST RISING HYBRID WARFARE THREATS

Hybrid warfare, blending military coercion with cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, and weaponised migration, poses mounting threats to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russia’s strategy increasingly targets critical infrastructure, elections, and social cohesion, with ripple effects across Poland, Finland, and Germany. While the Baltic states have strengthened resilience through energy diversification and NATO cooperation, vulnerabilities in infrastructure and society remain dangerously exposed.

AIR MARSHAL ANIL KHOSLA (R)

FOR NEWS ANALYTICS

a 5 mins read.

Hybrid operations, unlike traditional warfare, bridge martial coercion with non-military measures like sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, interference in elections, energy blackmail, and weaponised migration. These processes are intentionally vague, cheap but high-impact, allowing state and non-state actors to destabilise their competitors without crossing transparent thresholds.

The Russian hybrid war strategy has been a security concern for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, the danger does not end there in the Baltics: Poland, Finland, and Germany are also at risk due to shared energy and digital infrastructure, political interdependence, and disinformation.

Critical infrastructure—notably submarine cables, energy supplies, and digital networks—has also been a key target. With an assault upon such an asset requiring minimal effort but with ripple effects containing security, economic, and psychological consequences, at least 11 North and Baltic Sea underwater cables have been severed since 2023, both demonstrating the technical possibility and the deniable nature of such an act. This article examines hybrid war strategy across the Baltic states, quantifying regional resiliency and defining policy measures to be taken in defence of their infrastructure.

HYBRID THREATS AND ACTIVITIES

Hybrid war threatens Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania seriously, attacking the cohesion of society, infrastructure, and democratic procedures using methods of sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, and disruptions of energy supplies. These are intended to destabilise the Baltic states without triggering traditional war, exploiting vulnerabilities in linked systems.

Disinformation is highly effective in hybrid warfare, often employed through AI-generated content, deepfakes, and targeted social media campaigns on platforms such as Telegram, TikTok, and local networks. All are designed to produce narratives around specific strategic interests, with linguistic or cultural minorities targeted to be manipulated into divisions. For example, messages can utilise themes of discrimination, nostalgia, or suspicion of international coalition-building. Classic cases such as the 2003 Lithuanian presidential foreign-linked funding scandal illustrate how external actors exploit political weaknesses. Current disinformation operations are more likely to erode support for active conflicts, destabilise international partnership trust, and amplify societal fault lines.

Military displays in strategic regions amplify hybrid strategies by reinforcing the perception of a credible threat.

Low-tech sabotage can be thoroughly debilitating to social cohesion and infrastructure. For example, the 2024 arson assault on a Vilnius storage facility disclosed weakness in key logistics networks. Likewise, the demolition of historic monuments across regions has been utilised as a means of stirring ethnic or cultural tensions. Deployment of incendiary devices transported through logistics networks in attacks also demonstrates the capabilities for covert disruption. Attacks on key infrastructure—e.g., submarine cables carrying transatlantic communications, financial transactions, and military communications—are often attributed to accidents but raise concern about intentional sabotage. These attacks highlight the asymmetric benefits pursued through precision disruption, taking advantage of vulnerabilities in interdependent systems.

Cyber war is a key component of hybrid strategy, and organisations often conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on government networks, energy organisations, and public services. For instance, in 2022, a cyberattack on a Baltic energy organisation disconnected thousands of customers. In showpiece events, such as the 2023 Vilnius NATO Summit, cyberattacks were conducted on public websites and ministries to cause embarrassment and instability.

Espionage is used to support these activities, with nationals reportedly being recruited to collect intelligence or conduct minor sabotage operations. These activities are intended to erode confidence and destabilise institutions by taking advantage of insider access or local dissatisfaction.

Energy infrastructure is also a primary target in hybrid warfare, and physical and cyberattacks are employed to erode confidence in alternative energy sources. Diversification policies—such as the Baltic connection to the EU power grid in 2024 or construction of LNG terminals and pipelines—have mitigated these risks. Nevertheless, ongoing attacks on critical infrastructure highlight the long-term problem of safeguarding energy networks against hybrid methods.

Humanitarian crises can sometimes be used for strategic purposes through organised waves of migration. In the 2021 EU border crisis, migrants fleeing war zones were guided towards border regions, putting pressure on local governments and testing regional security efforts. Such crises are intended to challenge global coalitions and politicise public discussion of migration and security, exerting pressure on governments and societies.

A display of military strength in strategic regions can serve to enhance hybrid strategies by providing the context of a credible threat. Mass movements, which mimic rapid penetrations into extensive areas of terrain or clandestine activities in border regions, increase tensions and amplify the impact of covert operations. They capitalise on geographical proximity and cultural ties to vulnerable areas, thereby enhancing the perceived threat of escalation.

Election interference is a popular hybrid method that employs cyberattacks, the leakage of sensitive information, and disinformation as tools to influence public opinion. Social media mobilisation campaigns predicated on the amplification of controversial issues—whether nationalist feelings or ethnic grievances—can influence closely fought elections. They seek to delegitimise democratic institutions and undermine governments amenable to confronting strategic interests.

REACTION CAPABILITY

Despite the seriousness of the threat, the Baltic states have been largely resilient. They have come a long way in countering such vulnerabilities with modernisation, social integration, and neighbourhood cooperation. Investments in energy diversification—for instance, Lithuania’s terminal for liquefied natural gas and the Baltic disconnection from old energy grids in 2024—have reduced reliance on external sources. Nevertheless, critical infrastructure such as underwater cables, energy networks, and democratic systems remains an attractive target for low-cost, deniable assaults.

Estonia hosts the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) of NATO. Cyber defence and information warfare coordination are instead functions of Lithuania’s National Cyber Security Centre and Latvia’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Civil defence institutions—such as Estonia’s 15,000-strong National Guard—facilitate rapid mobilisation in times of crisis.

Integration of the Baltic states’ power grid with European grids, the Świnoujście terminal in Poland, and the Klaipėda LNG terminal are achievements of energy security. These steps limit Moscow’s influence and bolster NATO’s strategic depth.

Integration has been supported through the establishment of citizenship rights and the encouragement of learning the Russian language, which helps in recognising their cultural identities. These efforts are essential in reducing feelings of alienation. Still, some challenges persist because of the ongoing tension between policies aimed at promoting integration and nationalist ideas that emphasise linguistic sameness.

Interagency coordination in the region is weak. Border control, crisis management, and intelligence exchange often do not operate in a coordinated manner. Latvia’s border guards, for example, have been criticised compared to more advanced Estonian and Nordic counterparts. NATO and American surveillance capabilities compensate to some extent, but reform at the national level remains necessary.

STRENGTHENING BALTIC DEFENCES

Strengthening Baltic defences against hybrid threats involves building inclusive integration, establishing a Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem (CORE), protecting critical infrastructure, modernising electricity laws, enhancing transparency, and strengthening regional and international cooperation. Recommendations include:

Facilitate Inclusive Integration: Expand programs to provide equal civic, economic, and political opportunities to cultural and linguistic minorities, fostering national unity in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Envision a Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem (CORE): Design an integrated system among the defence, cybersecurity, energy, and communications sectors to develop national resilience in the context of hybrid threats, tailored to Baltic priorities.
Guard Critical Infrastructure: Prioritise the protection of submarine communications cables and offshore energy installations, leveraging regional cooperation.

Protecting Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from hybrid warfare is not just regional; it is a global challenge demanding international support for vulnerable neighbouring nations in conflict zones.

Modernise Legal Frameworks: Encourage modernisation of international treaties, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to counter hybrid threats to maritime and critical infrastructure, with the Baltic states coordinating regional action.
Increase Transparency in Deployments: Clearly inform Baltic citizens of regional defence measures to reassure them while dissuading potential aggressors, highlighting national sovereignty.
Upgrade Specialised Forces: Enhance Baltic special forces and civilian defence units with assistance from premier intelligence and surveillance capabilities in cooperation with allied countries.
Upgrade Regional Exercises: Regularly conduct exercises such as BALTOPS and Baltic Sentry, including cyber, maritime, and information warfare drills, to attain greater readiness and interoperability.
Launch Multilingual Campaigns: Develop multilingual communication strategies to counter disinformation and foster social cohesion across Baltic communities.
Enhance Monitoring and Reaction: Collaborate with national cyber units and regional allies to track disinformation in real time, quickly discredit fakes, and ensure a Baltic-led response.
Enhance Intelligence Sharing: Expand cooperation with European and Indo-Pacific partners to improve early warning and reaction to hybrid threats.
Advance Global Norms: Promote global norms to safeguard crucial infrastructure such as submarine cables and cyberspace, positioning the Baltic states as leaders in securing the global commons.

Defending Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania against hybrid war is not merely a regional security problem—it is a global issue requiring support for smaller neighbouring nations in a war zone. There is a need to maintain resilience in the information, digital, and physical spaces. The Baltic states can help find solutions to hybrid threats and ensure long-term stability by promoting domestic societal cohesion, fostering regional cooperation, and enhancing infrastructure security.

(Air Marshal Anil Khosla (R), Former Vice Chief, Indian Air Force. Researcher & Analyst Distinguished Fellow – USI & CAPS. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Herald.)

Key Takeaways