As the last pillars of Cold War–era arms control erode, the global nuclear order is entering a phase of dangerous recalibration. The impending expiry of New START, accelerating arsenal modernisation, and China’s doctrinal shift are reviving arms-race dynamics. Amid rising uncertainty and weakening guardrails, strategic stability is giving way to competition, ambiguity, and renewed nuclear risk.
LT GEN RAJ SHUKLA (R) | FORMER ARMY COMMANDER | FOR NEWS ANALYTICS
4 mins read.
As if only to add to a long list of woes, global peace and stability are beset by a new challenge—aggressive pursuits in the nuclear weapons domain, triggering what many fear may be the resumption of a nuclear arms race. The expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, on 5 February 2026, may well be an added trigger. The treaty limits the number of long-range nuclear weapons that the USA and Russia could deploy; since a follow-on agreement does not appear to be in the offing, we may be entering a new era of nuclear arsenal expansion.
It is therefore a good time to audit the state of aggregate nuclear risk and uncertainty. New START has served as a guardrail of sorts against an unconstrained arms race. The treaty limits the deployment of long-range nuclear warheads to 1,550 each for Russia and the United States. It also contains provisions for on-site verification, allowing inspectors access to nuclear sites in Russia and the USA, backed by mandatory notification of weapon movements and changes in status. After the US and Russia found themselves on opposite sides in the Ukraine conflict, President Vladimir Putin suspended Russia’s participation in New START in February 2023, though he pledged to continue abiding by the treaty’s limits. The United States responded by terminating Russia’s ability to monitor US nuclear sites, revoking inspector visas, and denying clearance for Russian aircraft in US airspace. In January 2025, the US State Department declared it could not certify that Russia was complying with New START, though it reported that if Russia had exceeded the treaty’s limits, it was only by a whisker. It stated with high confidence that Russia did not engage in any large-scale activity above the treaty limits in 2024.
ARMS-CONTROL BREAKDOWN
With the looming expiration of New START, we may witness an era of arsenal expansion in which both the United States and Russia will be free to increase the number of deployed nuclear weapons. Both countries have the capacity to do this rather quickly, simply by deploying additional warheads on existing land-based or submarine-based missiles. Pressure to exceed the limits of New START has been growing—for example, in 2023, a congressionally appointed commission suggested that the United States increase its deployed strategic nuclear forces and recommended the building of new types of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.
We are also seeing a push in the United States to begin building new nuclear bomb cores, also known as plutonium pits, to arm new nuclear weapons. There are further urgings to ramp up the production of nuclear weapons. President Trump’s declaration on the resumption of nuclear testing complicates matters even more. The United States has conducted more than 1,000 explosive nuclear tests in its history—more than any other country—and has since developed sophisticated tools to ensure that the stockpile remains safe and reliable without explosive testing. If the United States were to resume explosive testing, it would shatter the global taboo against testing and encourage other countries, which possess far less experimental data, to follow suit. The United States, therefore, has the most to lose from a return to explosive nuclear testing.
The expiration of New START removes the final guardrail against an unconstrained nuclear arms race between the world’s two largest arsenals.
CHINA FACTOR
The rise of China in geopolitical terms has intensified nuclear competition further. The estimated expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal to 1,000 warheads by 2030, though still well below the Russian and American arsenals of 5,500 and 4,700 warheads, respectively, is a key factor for those pushing the United States to expand its nuclear arsenal. Past efforts to draw China into trilateral negotiations have failed, since the United States maintains a nuclear arsenal more than four times the size of China’s. The Chinese insist that, given the relative size of arsenals, there is little logic in expecting China to be bound by any version of START. In fact, if there is one country in recent times that has truly “broken out” in nuclear terms, it is China. In its policy orientation, primarily on account of a substantial upgradation of its space-based early warning capacities, China is moving away from No First Use (NFU) towards Launch on Warning (LOW).
China’s shift towards Launch on Warning and rapid nuclear expansion is reshaping deterrence dynamics far beyond the traditional U.S.–Russia framework.
| India’s Nuclear Posture in a Post–Arms Control World
The erosion of global arms-control regimes places new pressures on India’s nuclear posture. As U.S.–Russia constraints weaken and China accelerates nuclear modernisation, India faces a more complex deterrence environment defined by ambiguity and asymmetry. China’s shift towards Launch-on-Warning and Pakistan’s tightening civil–military control over nuclear forces compress India’s decision-making timelines. At the same time, advances in missile defence, hypersonic systems, and space-based surveillance challenge long-held assumptions underpinning India’s doctrine of credible minimum deterrence. In this evolving landscape, India must reassess force readiness, signalling, and command resilience while preserving strategic autonomy and crisis stability
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China is expanding its nuclear triad with the aim of developing both counter-value and counter-force capabilities. Missile silos and ranges are being expanded to target not only American deployments in the Pacific but also the American heartland. It has inducted tactical nuclear weapons into its inventory and practises “ambiguity”, not “transparency”, as an organising principle. The Chinese Western Theatre Command, for example, has in its inventory conventional, ballistic, cruise, hypersonic, and nuclear missiles, stitched together in an integrated framework. The PLA Rocket Force is a sophisticated and potent amalgam of conventional missiles, drones, and nuclear capabilities. China has also crossed a major nuclear red line—it has begun loading its nuclear silo fields with solid-fuelled nuclear missiles, signalling higher levels of nuclear readiness.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The 27th Constitutional Amendment, whereby the head of Pakistan’s Strategic Command (with nuclear forces under command) will always be from the Army and will report to the unified position of the Chief of Defence Force and the Chief of the Army Staff (Field Marshal Asim Munir), represents a move to strengthen the nuclear–terror complex in Pakistan.
Trump’s perceived abandonment of allies and partners has not been helpful to the cause of nuclear stability either. Now that the North Korean nuclear arsenal has the American heartland in its crosshairs, South Korea is seeking fresh guarantees on American commitment to “extended nuclear deterrence”. There are growing whispers in Japan regarding the need to weaponise its nuclear capabilities to deter Chinese aggression.
As arms control erodes, nuclear credibility is increasingly defined by readiness, ambiguity, and the capacity to expand arsenals rapidly.
The global nuclear framework, as we see it, is in a state of deep flux. Strategic uncertainties loom large even as new deterrence frameworks are redefining the power equilibrium. Amid the global nuclear shake-out, India’s nuclear posture too merits a root-and-branch review—in terms of policy slant, questions of transparency and ambiguity, missile configurations, silos, interceptor topology, structural corrections, and readiness levels.
We will talk about the drivers and imperatives in detail another day. Till then, Happy New Year.
(Lt Gen Raj Shukla (R), former Army Commander and currently a Member of UPSC. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Herald.)
QUICK INSIGHTS
- The expiry of New START removes the last major constraint on U.S.–Russia nuclear competition.
- Both Washington and Moscow can rapidly expand deployed nuclear arsenals without treaty limits.
- China’s accelerating nuclear build-up and doctrinal shift are destabilising global deterrence balances.
- Regional nuclear dynamics, including Pakistan and North Korea, further compound strategic uncertainty.
- India must reassess its nuclear posture amid weakening arms-control regimes and rising global risks.
