The turmoil that has engulfed West Asia since 2023 has exposed the fragility of global trade networks and the limits of military deterrence.
Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos, Tel-Aviv, Israel | Senior Fellow At The Begin-Sadat Center For Strategic Studies | For The News Analytics Herald
3 mins read.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023, was envisioned as a transformative network linking India, the Gulf and Europe through maritime routes, railways, energy infrastructure and digital connectivity. Since then, the Hamas attacks of October 2023, the Gaza war, Red Sea shipping disruptions and escalating regional tensions have raised questions about its viability.
Yet these crises do not undermine IMEC’s logic; they reinforce it. They have exposed the limitations of security paradigms based primarily on military deterrence and highlighted the need for resilient connectivity. IMEC should therefore be seen not merely as infrastructure or an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but as an architecture of strategic redundancy, functional cooperation and secure interdependence.
THE RESILIENCE IMPERATIVE
Recent disruptions in the Red Sea and persistent concerns surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated global trade’s dependence on vulnerable maritime chokepoints. Military deterrence remains essential, but cannot alone ensure uninterrupted supply chains. Ports, shipping lanes, digital infrastructure and energy networks remain vulnerable even when direct military threats are contained.
IMEC addresses this vulnerability by creating alternative maritime and overland pathways connecting India with Europe through the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean. Rather than replacing existing routes, it creates redundancy: if one route is disrupted, alternatives remain available. In an era of persistent uncertainty, such redundancy is increasingly a national security imperative.
In an age of persistent disruption, resilient connectivity is no longer an economic option but a strategic necessity.
IMEC also reflects a wider geopolitical trend. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the International North-South Transport Corridor, the Middle Corridor and Africa’s Lobito Corridor demonstrate how infrastructure has become an instrument of strategic influence. Twenty-first-century power increasingly rests not simply on controlling territory, but connectivity.
INDIA’S STRATEGIC ANCHOR
India is more than another IMEC participant; it is the corridor’s eastern strategic anchor. Its market scale, maritime capabilities, digital infrastructure and standing across the Global South give the initiative substantial strategic weight.
For New Delhi, IMEC is therefore linked to national security, supply-chain resilience and global influence. It deepens India’s engagement with West Asia, strengthens connectivity with Europe and positions the country at the centre of emerging intercontinental networks.
Israel’s potential contribution similarly extends beyond Haifa Port. Modern corridors require cybersecurity, critical-infrastructure protection, resilient digital systems, maritime awareness and crisis-management capabilities. Israel’s experience in these areas could make it a contributor to IMEC’s resilience rather than simply a transit point.
This also broadens India-Israel cooperation beyond its traditional defence focus. Protecting ports, digital infrastructure and supply chains from cyber threats and sabotage introduces a new strategic agenda: the security of connectivity.
GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES
IMEC nevertheless faces significant political obstacles. The absence of Saudi-Israeli normalisation, domestic pressures across the Arab world and regional rivalries complicate implementation. Competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE also demonstrates that Gulf states cannot be treated as a homogeneous strategic bloc.
Türkiye presents another paradox. Despite geographically bridging Asia and Europe and possessing extensive transport infrastructure, it is bypassed in IMEC’s present design. This illustrates that contemporary corridors are determined not by geography alone, but increasingly by strategic trust, predictability and political alignment.
IMEC may therefore not represent the shortest route, but rather one its participants perceive as offering greater long-term reliability.
FUNCTIONAL NORMALISATION
Perhaps IMEC’s most consequential potential lies in its political effects. Conventional thinking assumes political reconciliation must precede economic integration. IMEC suggests the reverse may also occur.
Coordinating customs procedures, logistics, digital standards and cybersecurity protocols can create habits of cooperation based on shared interests. This “functional normalisation” does not eliminate political disagreements; instead, it increases the cost of disruption and encourages pragmatic management of differences.
IMEC’s greatest value may lie not in transporting goods, but in building trust across a fractured region.
BEYOND INFRASTRUCTURE
Ultimately, IMEC represents more than a transportation initiative. It is an experiment in creating a new regional operating system based on resilience, redundancy and institutionalised cooperation alongside traditional deterrence.
The crises since 2023 have not invalidated connectivity; they have demonstrated its necessity. In an era of persistent disruption, resilient connectivity itself is becoming a form of security.
The future of regional order may therefore depend not only on states’ ability to deter threats, but on their capacity to build networks capable of surviving them. IMEC’s enduring significance may ultimately lie less in the goods it transports than in the architecture of trust, resilience and cooperation it could create across one of the world’s most fragmented regions.
