Both nuclear-armed powers, have been engaged in an ongoing standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since April 2020. The LAC remains a site of tension between India and China, with years of stand-offs and negotiations defining their strained relations. This article explores the progression of the conflict, recent developments, and the cautious optimism surrounding steps toward resolution while emphasizing the challenges ahead for both nations.
LT GEN KJ SINGH (R)
FOR THE NEWS ANALYTICS JOURNAL
a 4 mins read.
India and China, two rising powers armed with nuclear weapons, have been locked in a dangerous standoff on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since April 2020. These four years after the Galwan clashes in May 2020, both sides have witnessed the buildup of large forces and combat infrastructure. Chinese stalling tactics and stubbornness had hampered the initial attempts to disengage. It forced India to undertake quid-pro-quo operations by undertaking an audacious pre-emptive occupation of Kailash Heights, forcing the Chinese to relent at least partially in Feb 2021.
In the intervening period, there was another incident of physical clashes, mercifully without firing at Yangtse (Arunachal) in Dec 2022. Even after twenty-two rounds of talks between military commanders, only some semblance of disengagement and creation of buffer (no patrolling) zones could be achieved in PP-14 (Galwan), PP-15 (Hot Springs), PP-17-A (Gogra) and North Bank of Pangong Tso (between Finger-4 and Finger-8). Depsang and Demchok were left unresolved and described as legacy issues. Both are strategically important and amounted to denial of access to PP-10, 11, 11-A, 12, and 13 in the Depsang plains, and two PPs in Demchok.
India was forced to review and re-orient its deployment and effect induction of large formations from the Western borders against Pakistan to the Northern unresolved border against China. In effect, China had to be designated as the primary adversary.
Key challenges remain unresolved at strategic locations despite India’s firm stance and strategic quid-pro-quo operations, like occupying Kailash Heights and forced partial disengagement.
KAZAN AGREEMENT
The BRICS summit in Kazan catalysed the announcement of an agreement in the run-up to the summit meeting. This set the stage for a brief bilateral meeting between Chinese President Xi-Jinping and Indian PM, Narendra Modi. Both leaders, in short and limited exchange, endorsed the agreement and gave the go-ahead to Special Representatives on Boundary talks to resume negotiations for settlement.
As per some media reports, the broad contours of the agreement were nearly sealed before the BRICS summit in Aug 2023. However, it could not be clinched, as the Indian side stuck to its position of restoring patrolling rights in unresolved and strategic Depsang and Demchok sectors. Media speculation inferred that China had initially proposed no-patrolling, buffer zones, akin to PP-14 (Galwan), PP-15 (Hot Springs), PP-17-A (Gogra), and North Bank of Pangong-Tso, which amounted to no-patrolling zones. There is still considerable opacity and speculation as only sketchy details have been disseminated. Instead of a joint statement, both sides released their separate versions with some differences, thereby adding to avoidable confusion.
The experience of differing interpretations and some amount of obstinacy and retraction on the part of China calls for caution and the need to carefully monitor the progress of implementation. Indian reports are anchored on the hope for the restoration of the status quo ante as of April 2020. China referred to ‘progress on border problems’, averring tranquillity/ stability. with a focus on the resumption of trade and commerce without any restrictions. In a somewhat disingenuous manner, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seeks to legitimise altered positions in its favour and downplays unilateral forays.
Some credible reports indicate the commencement of the dismantling of temporary structures in Depsang and Demchok, yet modalities remain cloaked in secrecy. The frequency, methodology, and extent of patrolling, which resumed at the end of Oct are yet to be fully disclosed. Commencement of disengagement is indicative of detailed negotiations in multiple rounds of talks between formation commanders and contingency preparations. It is hoped that both sides, especially the Chinese continue to display accommodation and patience to obviate Galwan type of skirmish.
India is likely to be allowed to access PPs 10, 11,11-A, 12, and 13, thereby marking presence in 650sq km of Depsang plains. India would be able to send regulated patrols (15-18 soldiers) as per mutually agreed periodicity. The catch is what kind of control/ domination PLA is likely to maintain on the vital choke-point of ‘Bottleneck’ (Y-junction). Equally, the sensitive issue is- Will PLA be allowed to access strategically important areas near Burtse? India will also be allowed to access two PPs in Charding Nallah in Demchok-Chumar. The initial patrolling has resumed in both sectors but details are only sketchy.
Reportedly, graziers will be permitted traditional grazing rights. Translation of this into reality is likely to be beset with problems, as in the past, PLA has prevented even minor, livelihood-related infrastructure projects, by accusing India of altering status-quo. These have included minor and routine development works like irrigation channels and track improvement. There are conflicting reports and speculation on negotiations about the resumption of patrolling by PLA in Yangtse and Asaphila in Arunachal.
PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT
It is fair to infer that China in Eastern Ladakh unlike the South China Sea has shown flexibility and even some accommodation. Far removed from pragmatism and realistic appraisal, armed with the make-believe template of having forced China to tow the Indian line, some of our media is in celebratory mode and building unrealistic hype. In retrospect, the PLA has not yet offered any explanation for its surprise coercive manoeuvre in 2020, defying all protocols and border agreements. It has also managed to create an inexplicable category of ‘legacy’ issues to describe Depsang and Demchok. Unfortunately, it also entailed acquiescence by some of our ill-informed experts. The fact that a slew of measures is being initiated in these sectors validates that there was a significant alteration of so-called agreed legacy positions before April 2020.
In the cacophony of chest-thumping, the most mature articulation has been by Gen Upendra Dwivedi, the Army Chief. He has expressed cautious optimism and has reiterated the need for confidence building through incident-free patrolling. Unlike Twitter-yodhas, the buck and bullets, finally stop at his command post. The domino effect, leading to hype and expectations, marked with a changed lexicon of peace, tranquility, and normalcy, needs to be moderated as both sides have an arduous, long way to complete the 3-D process of disengagement, de-escalation, and finally de-induction.
The infrastructure created by PLA in terms of communications (roads, bridges, helipads, and airfields) and habitation (shelters for troops and Xiaokangs, border villages) indicates plans and intentions for an enhanced long-term presence in proximity and striking distance of LAC. Lowering of guard and vigil on our part based on unverified hype will only amount to hara-kiri.
China’s strategic infrastructure near the LAC suggests a prolonged intent to dominate, alarming India to modernize border capabilities and maintain heightened vigilance.
MACRO PERSPECTIVE
Sinologists opine that dealing with China is a function of the 4-Ps. The first is power asymmetry, which between India and China is considerable. Chinese GDP (USD 17.8 trillion) is five times the Indian GDP (USD 3.5 trillion). China’s known defense expenditure estimated at USD 222 billion is three times India’s USD 75 billion. India has a trade deficit of USD 101.28 billion and it is increasing with continued dependencies in primary sectors of pharmaceuticals, electronics, solar energy, batteries, and chemicals. Our endeavors for de-coupling supply chains and dependencies on China seem to have produced counterproductive.
Many other countries like Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Turkey have gained more than India in China’s plus One policy. Asymmetry is reducing but may take decades to build up to credible dissuasion. However, despite asymmetry, we are aided by terrain-high altitude, where power application is limited by terrain and weather, above all force deployment is sequential and graduated. Most importantly, we have unmatched expertise in high-altitude warfare. Our focus has to be on ramping up border infrastructure and focused modernization for quid-pro-quo (QPQ) options like Operation Snow-Leopard on Kailash Heights in Sept 2020.
India’s other strength is our maritime geography and sea-faring skills with the domination of sea lanes, creating a Malacca dilemma for China. We need to leverage this more optimally with higher capital investments. It will be important to persist with de-risking and minimizing dependency on Chinese supply chains, to reduce asymmetry and vulnerability. The second determinant in the Sino-Indian matrix is partnerships and alliances, China in the Cold War power-play, initially partnered with Russia to combat the USA. It did a flip-flop and joined the USA, in Kissinger’s great game to check-mate Russia. In the current and future dynamics, China in the lead role is increasingly veering towards Russia. A new power axis is emerging around China Russia-Iran-North Korea and Turkey. China, despite building BRICS as an alternative to QUAD is likely to always remain wary of India’s rise.
The third factor is perception, where we need to remain alive to challenges of narrative crafting, lawfare, and imaginative cartography, backed up with whole-scale renaming by China. The most important issue is the perimeter or boundary, which China wants to resolve on her terms. China has resolved land frontiers with all except India and Bhutan. However, the latter is increasingly in conciliatory mode. Our diplomats and troops have formidable challenges ahead. They should abide by verification before trusting, and also be prepared for the long haul.
(Lt Gen(R) KJ Singh, Former Western Army Commander and State Information Commissioner. He was Maharaja Ranjit Singh Chair Prof in PU & is Hony Prof currently in PU & CU. Regular columnist & commentator on National Security. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Journal.)
