Russia’s Ukraine invasion reshaped Europe’s security, driving rearmament and autonomy debates, yet dependence on U.S. power questions true strategic sovereignty.
Ambassador Srikumar Menon, IFS(R) | For News Analytics
5 mins read.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked the most significant rupture in Europe’s security environment since the Cold War. For decades, European states had treated large-scale interstate conflict as a distant possibility, allowing military capabilities to decline while relying on economic interdependence, diplomacy, and the stabilising presence of the United States.
The Ukraine war overturned these assumptions. High-intensity conflict returned to Europe’s doorstep, exposing depleted arsenals, fragile defence industries, and deep structural dependence on American military power.
In response, the European Union accelerated rearmament efforts through initiatives such as “ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030.” Defence spending surged across the continent, and long-standing political positions shifted. The concept of “strategic autonomy”—once largely confined to French policy thinking—entered mainstream European discourse.
Germany’s declaration of a Zeitenwende symbolised this transformation. Announced shortly after the invasion, it marked a decisive shift in German defence, foreign, and energy policy, including a €100 billion military fund and reduced dependence on Russian energy. Other states, particularly Poland, the Baltic countries, and Nordic nations, followed with rapid military expansion, while NATO raised expectations beyond the traditional 2 per cent spending benchmark. Yet a central question persists: does this rearmament translate into genuine strategic autonomy, or is Europe rebuilding within a system still anchored in U.S. leadership?
SIGNIFICANCE OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
European “strategic autonomy” refers to the capacity to make sovereign decisions and act collectively in defence and security without excessive reliance on external powers, particularly the United States. It does not imply disengagement from NATO, but rather the ability to act independently when required.
Since the 2016 EU Global Strategy, autonomy has been framed as multidimensional—encompassing military capability, industrial resilience, technological sovereignty, and political cohesion. In principle, it positions Europe as a strategic actor rather than merely a consumer of security.
In practice, however, the concept remains contested. France views autonomy as essential in a multipolar order, while many Eastern European states fear it could weaken NATO and dilute the American security guarantee. These differences continue to shape an uneven trajectory.
EUROPE’S REARMAMENT

Europe is rearming at a scale not seen in decades. Defence spending among European NATO members has risen sharply since 2022, with new targets pushing long-term commitments significantly higher. Poland now spends over 4 per cent of GDP on defence, while Germany aims to approach 3.5 per cent by the end of the decade.
At the EU level, mechanisms such as the European Defence Fund, PESCO, and SAFE seek to strengthen industrial capacity, expand ammunition and air defence production, and encourage joint procurement. The Readiness 2030 framework aims to mobilise substantial financial resources through coordinated investment.
However, rearmament remains uneven and largely nationally driven. Fiscal constraints, domestic politics, and varying threat perceptions shape spending decisions. Many states continue to prioritise off-the-shelf acquisitions over collaborative European projects, limiting the development of independent capabilities.
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION

Political fragmentation remains the primary obstacle to European strategic autonomy. The EU comprises 27 states with differing strategic priorities: Eastern members focus on Russia, southern states on instability in the Mediterranean and Africa, while France and Germany diverge on autonomy and NATO’s role.
This fragmentation extends to defence procurement and planning. Europe continues to operate multiple parallel systems, resulting in duplication, inefficiency, and limited interoperability. National preferences often outweigh collective priorities. As a result, rearmament risks reinforcing national silos rather than creating a cohesive European defence framework.
THE U.S. FACTOR

Despite increased European spending, the United States remains indispensable to European security. American capabilities underpin NATO’s core functions, including nuclear deterrence, strategic mobility, missile defence, intelligence, and command systems.
Paradoxically, Europe’s rearmament has often deepened this dependence. To address urgent capability gaps, many states have procured U.S. platforms such as advanced fighter aircraft and missile defence systems. While this enhances immediate readiness, it entrenches long-term reliance on American technology and support.
Replacing U.S. capabilities would require significant financial investment, extended timelines, and political transformation. At present, Europe lacks the capacity to independently conduct large-scale, high-intensity operations.
Rearmament Without Independence?

This reveals the central paradox of Europe’s defence revival. The Ukraine war triggered a strategic awakening, yet also reaffirmed American indispensability. Europe is spending more and coordinating more—but largely within a U.S.-led framework.
One view holds that strategic autonomy remains largely aspirational, with rearmament strengthening NATO rather than reducing dependence. Another suggests autonomy need not imply full independence, but the capacity to act without U.S. leadership in limited scenarios. The risk lies in equating expenditure with transformation. Without deeper integration, common planning, and shared command structures, rearmament may remain a costly but incomplete effort.
REARMAMENT WITHOUT INDEPENDENCE?
Europe’s autonomy debate is closely linked to evolving transatlantic relations. Recent U.S. policy trends have emphasised burden-sharing and prioritised the Indo-Pacific, signalling a more conditional approach to European security.
This has introduced a degree of uncertainty within Europe regarding long-term U.S. commitments. While the transatlantic partnership remains essential, its nature is changing—becoming less automatic, more transactional, and increasingly shaped by European efforts to hedge against strategic unpredictability.
EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS

By early 2026, Europe stands at a critical juncture. Defence ambitions are significant, and spending commitments are substantial. Yet strategic autonomy remains incomplete. Political fragmentation limits cohesion, while reliance on U.S. enablers constrains independent action.
Strategic autonomy is best understood not as a fixed outcome, but as an evolving process. The Ukraine war has accelerated this trajectory by exposing vulnerabilities and forcing structural change.
The central challenge for Europe is not rearmament alone, but the conversion of expenditure into genuine strategic capability through integration, coordination, and political alignment. Until then, Europe risks rearming without achieving true independence—building strength, but not yet sovereignty.

















