The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is characterized by deep historical, cultural, and political complexities, with both countries sharing over 2,600 kilometers of porous borders and longstanding ethnic and tribal ties. However, in recent years, this relationship has become increasingly difficult, especially after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Initially, Pakistan was optimistic that the Taliban’s victory would address Pakistan’s security concerns. Yet, this anticipated cooperation has been marred by rising tensions and competing regional interests.
Ambassador Sushil Kumar Singhal, IFS (R) for The News Analytics Journal
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On August 15, 2021, Pakistan was jubilant about the collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government in Kabul, celebrating the Taliban’s return to power. This was partly because Pakistan had supported the Taliban during their earlier rule in the 1990s, and perceived them as a potential ally in reducing Indian influence in the region. Pakistan hoped for a new era of collaboration, expecting that the Taliban would prioritize addressing Pakistan’s security concerns, especially regarding the TTP, a militant group though ideologically close to the Taliban that had long operated from Afghan soil and posed a major threat to Pakistan’s internal security.
Then-Prime Minister Imran Khan hailed the Taliban’s victory as a triumph for the Afghan people and celebrated the removal of the “shackles of slavery,” referring to the U.S.-led occupation. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi dismissed Western concerns about the Taliban’s treatment of women and minorities, labelling such criticisms as “propaganda.” However, Pakistan’s optimism quickly turned to disappointment as the Taliban, upon assuming power, focused on their national interests rather than aligning with the security objectives of its mentor.
Pakistan feels that the Taliban has not only failed to honour their commitments but also allowed the TTP to operate with impunity.
PAK’S FAILING EXPECTATIONS
While Pakistan had hoped that the Taliban would assist in eliminating the TTP, the Taliban’s primary concern was to consolidate their power in Afghanistan and stabilize their government. The Taliban’s leadership shares ideological ties with the TTP, which advocates for the establishment of an Islamic state within Pakistan’s borders. Instead of prioritizing Pakistan’s security, the Taliban maintained their close relationship with the TTP, which allowed the militant group to continue its activities from Afghan soil.
Despite material and moral support for the struggle of the Taliban against the U.S.-led forces, their refusal to act against the TTP has exacerbated tensions between the two countries. Since the return to power of Taliban 2, Pakistan has refrained from recognizing the Taliban government, signalling growing frustration and disillusionment with the Taliban government policies.
The Durand Line, drawn in 1893 during British colonial rule, divides the Pashtun-dominated tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. While Pakistan sees the Durand Line as a legitimate international border, Afghanistan has consistently refused to recognize it, arguing that the agreement, which was made between the British Empire and Afghanistan’s Emir, expired in 1993.
The dispute over the Durand Line has been a source of significant tension, particularly since Pakistan began constructing a fence along the border in 2017. The fence, which is intended to prevent cross-border militancy and facilitate border control, has been met with fierce opposition from Afghanistan, as Pashtun nationalist sentiment remains strong. For many Afghans, the Durand Line represents a colonial legacy that divided their people.
Moreover, the construction of the fence has had significant humanitarian implications, as it has separated families and disrupted traditional trade routes. Farmers have been unable to access their land across the border, leading to economic hardship and increasing resentment, which has been exploited by groups like the TTP to recruit new cadres.
GROWING SECURITY THREAT
The TTP has become more active under the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud, with the group intensifying its attacks on Pakistani military and civilian targets. The Taliban’s unwillingness to rein in the TTP has made it increasingly difficult for Pakistan to achieve peace and security along its western border. Pakistan’s frustration with the Taliban’s inaction on this front culminated in a series of airstrikes and drone attacks in December 2024, targeting alleged TTP militants in Afghanistan. The airstrikes, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of people, further escalated tensions, as the Taliban accused Pakistan of targeting innocent civilians and vowed retaliation.
The TTP’s continued presence in Afghanistan and its growing capacity to launch attacks inside Pakistan have created a volatile security environment. Despite repeated efforts to negotiate a peace agreement, the situation remains fluid, with both sides accusing each other of violating and failing to honour commitments.
The geopolitical position of Afghanistan at the crossroads of South and Central Asia makes her a critical player in regional security and economic dynamics. The return of Taliban to power has drawn a mixed response from Afghanistan’s neighbours, each with their own concerns and interests in the region.
STRATEGIC INTEREST
India has taken a cautious approach to the Taliban’s return. While India has expressed concerns about the Taliban’s treatment of women and minorities, it has also recognized the importance of engaging with Kabul for its regional security and economic interests. India has been involved in reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan and has sought to maintain a presence in the country despite the Taliban’s rise to power. The recent meeting in Dubai between Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Vikram Misri Foreign Secretary, the highest level of contact so far has been said to have led to a promise to revive the pending projects in Afghanistan among other understandings.
Iran and Russia, similarly, have expressed concerns about the Taliban’s governance, particularly its treatment of ethnic minorities such as the Hazaras, who are predominantly Shia Muslims. Both countries, however, have chosen to engage with the Taliban diplomatically, primarily driven by security concerns related to the growing influence of groups like the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). These regional actors have engaged with the Taliban in an attempt to influence its policies and mitigate the threat posed by radical militant groups operating within Afghanistan.
CHINA FACTOR
China, which shares a border with Afghanistan, has adopted a pragmatic approach to the Taliban. While China does not share Pakistan’s historical ties to the Taliban, it views Afghanistan as an important partner in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and has expressed interest in economic cooperation with the Taliban regime. China has invested in Afghanistan’s infrastructure and resource sectors, including mining and energy, but its engagement has been cautious, driven primarily by economic interests rather than ideological alignment.
China has distanced itself from the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially about the TTP. In March 2024, when Chinese nationals were killed in attacks in Pakistan, China did not endorse Pakistan’s claim that the attackers were Afghan nationals, further indicating its desire to maintain a more neutral stance in the Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute. This growing divergence between Pakistan and China regarding the stability of Afghanistan could have long-term implications for regional security and economic cooperation.
CENTRAL ASIA
Central Asian countries, particularly Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, have expressed concern about the spread of militant groups like the ISKP, which has operated in northern Afghanistan. These countries fear that instability in Afghanistan could spill over into their territories, particularly as many of the militants in Afghanistan have ethnic ties to Central Asia.
The Taliban, for their part, have sought to strengthen ties with their Central Asian neighbours by offering security guarantees and promising to curb cross-border militancy. However, the fragile security situation in Afghanistan, coupled with the Taliban’s lack of control over all militant groups within the country, has made these assurances difficult to trust.
Central Asian states have sought to engage with the Taliban and encourage the formation of a more inclusive government that reflects the ethnic diversity of Afghanistan.
ECONOMIC CONNECTIVITY
Despite the political and security challenges, trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan continues to be an important aspect of their bilateral relationship. Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on Pakistan for imports, including fuel, food, and construction materials. However, trade has been hindered by frequent border closures and security concerns, which have disrupted the flow of goods and raised the cost of living in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), which allows Afghan exports to transit through Pakistan to international markets, remains a crucial element of economic cooperation between the two countries. However, the agreement has been undermined by political tensions, security concerns, and the lack of infrastructure to facilitate smooth trade.
Regional connectivity initiatives, such as the proposed trans-Afghan railway linking Uzbekistan with Pakistan, have the potential to transform the economic landscape, but the security situation and lack of investment have delayed progress on these projects.
A FRAGILE FUTURE
The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is at a critical juncture, shaped by deep-rooted historical issues, security concerns, and regional geopolitics. The return of the Taliban to power has created a complex web of challenges for Pakistan, which initially saw the Taliban as a potential ally but now faces growing tensions with Kabul. Taliban’s refusal to acknowledge the Durand Line and their ideological ties with the TTP have undermined the security interests of Pakistan, while Afghanistan continues to face its own set of internal and external pressures along with regional dynamics further complicating the fragile environment.
The deteriorating security situation, coupled with the economic challenges posed by disrupted trade and the lack of cooperation on counterterrorism efforts, paints a bleak picture for the future of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. The path forward for Pakistan and Afghanistan will depend on their ability to navigate these challenges and engage with regional and international actors in a way that promotes stability and economic cooperation. The evolving geopolitical dynamics, particularly the role of regional actors like China, may reshape the trajectory of this complex relationship.
The ultimate question remains whether both countries can find common ground amid their competing interests or whether the ongoing tensions will lead to a more permanent rupture in their bilateral ties and no one at this moment has any answer to this question.
(Ambassador Sushil Kumar Singhal, IFS (Retd), former Ambassador to Angola. He has served in Tanzania, Belgium, Bangladesh and Hungry. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Journal.)
