Dr. Madhumati Deshpande, Associate Professor, Christ University
a 6 mins read.
Post-Colonial Partners
Indian subcontinent’s ancient routes connected the South Indian kingdoms to East and Southeast Asian kingdoms and the cultural connections are impossible to ignore. However, the modern independent India took time to focus on East Asia despite the support it extended to the independence movements in the region and the support for the Non-Alignment by the countries in the East. The post-colonial approach, the economic success, and the rise of the Asian Tigers caught India’s attention. Over the next few years as India’s economy grew, the ASEAN nations also decided to embrace India into their fold as an economic partner. From being a Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992, India moved on to become a full-fledged dialogue partner and is currently a major trading partner of ASEAN countries.
What began as economic cooperation changed quickly into security cooperation with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which currently includes 27 members. There were several reasons why the countries of the Asia Pacific and their partners felt the need for security cooperation in the 1990s: the end of the Cold War and the power vacuum felt by the countries supported by the Soviet Union, the financial crisis of 1997, rising China and the rise in fundamentalism in the Islamic world post 9/11. India’s engagement with East Asia has evolved since then to a multifaceted approach aimed at enhancing its security cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and continuing the economic ties with countries in the region.
What sets the current strategy apart from the older involvement is the security angle that India has been pursuing in the last decade. Common concerns that bring Southeast and Northeast Asian countries are mainly the rise of Chinese naval power, maritime security, and freedom of navigation along with the non-traditional security concerns of disaster management, piracy, and trafficking. By actively participating in East Asian security architecture and contributing to regional stability, India seeks to play a constructive role in shaping the security environment in the region.
The increasing acceptance and adaptation of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct by countries in the region and the other important powers in the global order, has shifted India’s priorities in the region. The Indo-Pacific construct is a geo-strategic construct that brings countries together because of their insecurities in the current world order primarily because of the threat of rising China. India embraced the construct for its own national interest and added a boost to India’s aspirations of being a regional power. This significant shift can be seen in the way the current government created a new Division for the Indo-Pacific in the Ministry of External Affairs in 2018 to consolidate all the actions and policy elements in the region.
India has been actively engaging in security cooperation with East Asian countries to address shared security challenges, including maritime security, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation.
Key Elements of India’s Strategy
India’s security strategy in East Asia is complemented by its economic engagement with the region. India seeks to leverage already established economic ties to strengthen its strategic partnerships and enhance its influence in East Asia. This includes promoting trade and investment, participating in regional economic forums such as the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area, and supporting connectivity and infrastructure development projects such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). India has always emphasized the ASEAN centrality in its Indo-Pacific Policy. India is using several strategies to be engaged in the region.
India has been actively engaging in security cooperation with East Asian countries to address shared security challenges, including maritime security, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation. This involves participating in joint military exercises, bilateral defence dialogues, and intelligence-sharing arrangements with countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the ASEAN member states. India’s “Act East” policy, built on the earlier “Look East” policy, emphasizes the importance of security cooperation in East Asia.
India’s multilateral exercises like the MALABAR and MILAN mainly position India as a regional power by bringing in countries together to conduct exercises not only in the Indian Ocean Region but also in the South Pacific which has been a thorn in China’s side. With QUAD countries joining in these exercises, India has been able to improve its standing in the region. Naval and land exercises, both bilateral and multilateral, with Japan, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Myanmar, RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise), and COBRA-GOLD are all examples of how India is building strategic security partnerships to enhance cooperation and operational efficiency.
Given its geographical proximity to important sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, India places a strong emphasis on maritime security in East Asia. Through initiatives like the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), and IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association), India tries to enhance maritime security cooperation among the countries of the Indo-Pacific. In a recent meeting of the foreign ministers of the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) countries, India along with others emphasized the norms and regimes established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas in direct reference to the claims made by China in the South China Sea. India has expanded its naval presence and conducted joint patrols and exercises with East Asian countries to safeguard maritime routes and ensure freedom of navigation. India’s growing maritime capabilities, including its blue water navy and naval diplomacy initiatives, contribute to regional stability and security.
Building Strategic Partnerships
India has forged strategic partnerships with key East Asian countries to strengthen its security ties in the region. For example, India has deepened its defence cooperation with Japan through the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership, which includes joint naval exercises and defence technology collaboration. Similarly, India has enhanced security cooperation with Australia through the India-Australia Strategic Partnership, focusing on maritime security and counter-terrorism. With ASEAN, Vietnam, and South Korea the strategic partnership has deepened defence cooperation along with economic development.
India has actively participated in regional forums and initiatives in East Asia aimed at promoting security cooperation and confidence-building measures. This includes engagement with ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), where India contributes to discussions on regional security issues and promotes cooperative initiatives. The most important forum that India has been a part of in recent years is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the QUAD with Japan, Australia, and the United States.
The QUAD has seen its ups and downs since its initiation in 2007 by the Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe. Since 2017 it has taken a renewed vigour with QUAD leaders’ meetings online and in person and QAUD plus meetings. Although the discussions have been limited to softer security issues like the pandemic, disaster management, and free and open Indo-Pacific, it shows the commitment of these countries to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific through cooperation. QUAD is not yet an alliance however, the regularity of the meetings of the QUAD members and the attention it has gained has successfully rattled China.
At the 14th East Asia Summit in Bangkok in November 2019, Prime Minister Modi announced India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). This promoted on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit attempts to provide a comprehensive framework to the Indo-Pacific regional architecture. Consisting of India, ASEAN, the US, Australia, Japan, France and Vietnam. The initiative intends to drive deeper engagement between India and regional partners in seven key areas to collaboratively safeguard the oceans; enhance maritime security; preserve marine resources; build capacity and fairly share resources; reduce disaster risk; enhance science, technology, and academic cooperation; and promote free, fair and mutually beneficial trade and maritime transport.
The security angle is necessitated by a changing global order in which the belligerency of certain states has raised question marks on the rule-based order that India wants to uphold.
Strategic Correction
Overall, India’s strategy to strengthen its stakes in East Asia security is based on enhancing security cooperation, forging strategic partnerships, engaging in regional forums, safeguarding maritime security, along promoting economic integration in a post-pandemic world. The security angle is necessitated by a changing global order in which the belligerency of certain states has raised question marks on the rule-based order that India wants to uphold. Rather than condemning and alienating these countries, India is trying to build cooperation among the surrounding nations to counterbalance the threat perception. Southeast Asian nations have hedged against great power involvement since the end of the colonial period.
With India joining in and other Western powers converging more on the Indo-Pacific region, East Asia has emerged as an important geo-political region that is directing global politics to a greater degree. India’s “strategic correction to the East” as mentioned by the External Affairs Minister Mr. Jaishankar is a continuation of that strategy to achieve a balance in the region without openly threatening to say China or by going against it. This strategic correction could also lead to building trust in increased defence collaborations and security architecture.
(Dr. Madhumati Deshpande, is an Associate Professor, The Department of International Studies Christ University (Deemed to be University). The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Journal.)
