NATO’s Asia Outreach : A Tactical Gain With Strategic Loss

NewsAnalytics Bureau

(This article has also been featured by Indian Defence Review magazine.)

a 5 mins read.

New Outpost

In a rather unexpected move, recent developments indicate NATO’s willingness to open a ‘Liaison Office’ in Japan. If that is the eventuality it will be the first ever NATO’s formal outreach beyond the European Frontier. In the history of NATO, it has undertaken active military operations in various theatres of Asia be it the Iraq wars, Middle East conflicts and the latest Afghan war. By far Asian ventures of NATO have outstripped its European operations, where it has been restricted to limited intervention in the form of the naval blockade of Yugoslavia in 1992, and enforced a No-fly zone over Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping mission in 1999.

Formed on 4th April 1949 with 12 states and with a specific mandate to ensure the security of its member countries NATO continuously expanded its influence adding a still larger number of allies. Post nine expansions to date and Finland as its latest entrant, NATO’s membership has swelled to almost three times its original composition. Still, there are more, like member in waiting Sweden as also Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine which continues to seek NATO membership.

NATO’s interest in Asia is not new it already has formal consultation mechanisms in place through Mediterranean Dialogue with Israel and North Africa, a unique one-on-one Individual Cooperation Program (ICP) which includes Israel, Egypt and Jordan. It initiated political consultation with Japan in 1990 and signed a security agreement with Qatar in 2018. Though what’s new is, NATO’s willingness to focus on the Asia Pacific, an emerging theatre of power tussle while it is still embroiled in a major conflict next door. This may also be attributed to some purposeful prodding by the US and a rush in Japan to hurriedly stitch some kind of a reliable counter-action plan in the event of serious dispute escalation. The scope of the proposed ‘Liaison Office’ is still unclear with some suggesting it will have NATO’s military representatives for consultations only. But for sure the accompanying optics is much larger and deeper in strategic dynamics, likely resulting in major geopolitical turbulence!

 

Fragile Security

Asia is already witnessing a very complicated geopolitical environment, the majority of nations from West Asia, Central Asia and East Asia have been embroiled in either active conflicts or sustaining extremely fragile peace. West Asia has for long been a test bed of force projection for Western powers, conveniently aligned with regional players having aspirations much higher than their factual relevance. The result of all this has been highly damaging for the region. Central Asia on the other hand has got stuck in the balancing act of managing competing influences. The region borders Russia, and China and is considered a gateway to Europe, it also has the confluence of five former Soviet republics. It is a hotbed for transnational adventure among regional and global players. Though Central Asia keeps almost everyone interested, it still is holding back deliverables for each one of them.

NATO’s latest attempt for an almost backdoor entry into Asia is fraught with even greater complications especially considering its previous Asian endeavours. NATO’s foot on Japanese soil will have certain immediate security consequences – the US will undeniably drag NATO to increase its role and scope from word go and a willing Japan will look to appear ever more confident in its political and diplomatic response to current disputes without any actual augmentation of capabilities, China gets a clear run to term it a ‘Devil’s Axis’ against it led by US, NATO and allies. It has already been reflected in almost weekly commentary by Chinese media since last month against such development. This will further give China an opportunity to present itself as a forced victim among the comity of Asian states, which are clearly uncomfortable with such a prospect. This will invariably give Russia also a clear signal of NATO’s agenda of confronting it from other corners as Northern Japan neighbours the Russian East.

NATO can claim it is bound by Article 10 of its charter which clearly defines that NATO membership is exclusively for European countries and its purview of operation North of the Tropic of Cancer. That makes Japan a clear non-starter as an integral NATO ally. But what if NATO assets come under attack, will NATO not get an excuse for a military response? As far as charter obligations restricting its operation North of the Tropic of Cancer, we have already seen Afghan operation and NATO’s full-fledged participation in it. There is no need for geography lessons about Afghanistan being within NATO’s defined operational theatre. The issue of concern remains, a foot on the ground brings a whole lot of new equations in the operational calculus and probably Japan feels very strongly about it.

The recent visit of PM Kishida to Kyiv has further stimulated this thought in Tokyo that despite having all the wherewithal for active confrontation NATO couldn’t go to Ukraine as another great power is part of the conflict. Japan seems to have reversed the equation keeping the US on its soil as a guarantee for non-intervention by China and now seeking NATO’s presence as an additional insurance. Even ignoring for a while internal opposition by France and whether it has the capacity to prove its promises. Still, at the face of it, the implications are sobering and discomforting for other major Asian powers including India.

While NATO’s previous expansions were a matter within Europe the current Asian outreach is in an entirely different league all together. This development raises three specific questions; Firstly, why does NATO want a presence in Asia? Secondly, what makes Japan take the lead in hosting NATO? Thirdly, how will it impact an already fragile power equilibrium in the region? Issues apart from the essence of NATO’s Asian pivot have visible consequences as it gradually manifests further.

 

Questionable Endeavour

NATO’s political and military interventions to date have at best delivered limited success. Its operations in Asia have mostly been under UN mandate. But it chooses to intervene despite having hefty odds underlines that political considerations have weighed heavily over sound military logic. The latest withdrawal of NATO from Afghanistan was as much an embarrassment as it was demeaning. It inadvertently proved that NATO had only piggybacked the United States when it entered the fray. NATO’s clear inability was evident to sustain an operation of such magnitude on its own, even if it thought it must. The urgency shown towards the US dictated withdrawal timelines rather than dictating its own, had only eroded NATO’s credentials.

NATO till recently assumed itself as an effective counter to Russia at least in Europe. But its singular failure to stand on its feet and offer complete support came crashing on Ukraine. NATO’s role was akin to a warehouse offering stocks on credit. Most surprising was NATO never displayed a clear intent for the possibility of a direct confrontation if Ukraine is harmed. In warfare, it’s the capability that shapes intent and it’s the intent that defines actions. NATO failed on three major counts – its own decisiveness, unambiguous response and assessment of the adversary. A hell of ingredients for assured failure on the battlefield. NATO must give it to its adversary so that it better read its limited capabilities and shallow politics which eventually would result in its weak response. That’s a clear difference between NATO and other great powers, while major powers priorities their military responses NATO functions on minimum agreed consensus and unfortunately for NATO that cannot be altered.

 

Geopolitical Churn

Asia is going through a geopolitical churn. The new century has seen a sharp rise of China, a realignment of US strategic posture towards the Indo-Pacific, India’s steady growth in the region and matters of global governance, Japan discarding its age-old security outlook, North Korea approaching its military objectives faster than anticipated, the Middle East trying to settle down with some home truths. Economy and security playing up closer than ever before and not the least realignment of forces post-Ukraine conflict with Russia and China looking to integrate much closer than ever.

While challenges in the Indo-Pacific and waters around China are indeed very serious, even unilateral military and economic bullying by China has been a matter of severe discontent in many Asian capitals, but stepping into a new power block in the already complex security environment is not a comfortable thought for many. The US needs to play a cautious role here, probably pentagon feels a friendly military alliance closer on call would be a great help at a time of dire need and Japan going overboard for assured security guarantees, but its overall impact appears unfavourable on the region.

If the US chooses, to adopt a safer wait-and-watch approach it would result in the emergence of new fault lines something which will be counterproductive to various other meaningful measures that have been undertaken jointly by like-minded nations and their valued partners. Any move towards NATO’s stated desire for an Asia pivot must be scrutinised for its security and political viability through deep consultations with major partners in the region including India. A singular approach towards this sensitive issue may end up causing more strategic damage than achieving any tactical gains!

Be Our Premium Member. Join Us Now.

Subscribe to Blog via Email

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

More Similar Posts

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
You might also like

1 Comment. Leave new

Leave a Reply

Discover more from News Analytics

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading

Discover more from News Analytics

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading