The Ukraine war has redefined 21st-century warfare, exposing the vulnerabilities of tanks, artillery, and conventional doctrines in the face of drones, cyber disruption, and information warfare. For India, the lessons are urgent: agility, jointness, and resilience matter more than sheer mass. To remain secure in a volatile neighbourhood, India must modernise, innovate, and adapt at speed.
BY LT GEN A B SHIVANE (R)
FOR NEWS ANALYTICS
a 5 mins read.
The war in Ukraine has altered the perspective of conventional conflict in the 21st century. What was once taken for granted about mass, armour, and firepower has been unsettled by the speed of technological disruption. Armoured columns that for decades symbolised battlefield dominance have been hunted by drones costing a fraction of their price. Logistics depots thought to be safely tucked in the rear have been struck with precision. Command and communication networks have been paralysed by electronic warfare and cyber intrusions. The message is blunt. The character of war is shifting more quickly than doctrine or institutions are willing to admit.
Geography leaves no margin with battlespace geometry redefined. Unlike powers that can rely on oceans or alliances, India must contend with a harsh neighbourhood and adversaries who adapt with speed. They cooperate when convenient and challenge New Delhi from contested borders to the information space. For India, the Ukraine war is not an academic case study but a stark warning.
COLLAPSE OF OLD ASSUMPTIONS
Russia began the war with an offensive that looked familiar: massed armour, heavy artillery, and the expectation that numbers would bulldoze Ukrainian resistance. Within weeks, the approach was in tatters. Tanks that rolled forward without integrated air defence were destroyed by drones. Convoys stretched across long highways turned into easy targets for precision fires directed by live intelligence. Static defensive positions were exposed under relentless surveillance. The failure was not just of the platforms. It was the collapse of a doctrine that assumed firepower and mass could overwhelm a determined defender.
Ukraine’s forces were outgunned but adapted quickly. They turned commercial drones into weapons, used open-source intelligence, and improvised command networks to offset Russian advantages. Civilian innovation fed military agility. The effect was disproportionate to their resources. The lesson for others is clear: agility and speed matter more than bulk. Size without the ability to innovate is a liability.
Cognitive warfare has become central, shaping public opinion, morale, and legitimacy as operational factors. For India, weaknesses seen in Kargil and Galwan highlight the urgent need for resilience.
TECHNOLOGY AS EQUALISER
Drones and Autonomy: No single system has shaped the war in Ukraine as profoundly as drones. Small quadcopters costing a few hundred dollars have provided targeting data and dropped improvised munitions with devastating effect. Medium-altitude drones have carried out deep strikes. Loitering munitions, swarms both imported and indigenously adapted, have become a critical feature of Ukraine’s war machine, with C-UAS systems essential for defence.
AI now enables autonomous precision targeting and decentralised control, enhancing the kill web. It also highlights the need for layered air defence capable of countering both advanced aircraft and drones.
Precision with Mass: Western doctrines after the Gulf War emphasised precision as the dominant principle of warfare. The assumption was that guided munitions would replace the need for volume. Ukraine has shown that this is a false dichotomy. Precision is essential but not sufficient. Mass remains decisive, and the future lies in their combination.
The emerging model is “precise mass”, where large numbers of drones, rockets, and loitering munitions provide saturation, while precision strikes are reserved for high-value targets. This blending of accuracy with volume is cost-efficient and operationally effective. China’s kill web approach, which integrates sensors and shooters across domains into a seamless targeting network, reflects this evolution.
Electronic and Cyber Warfare: The electromagnetic spectrum has re-emerged as a contested domain. Russia’s use of jamming and spoofing has disrupted Ukrainian drone operations and communications, while Ukraine has responded by adapting frequencies and dispersing networks.
Cyber operations have become the backbone of kinetic attacks, targeting communication networks, power grids, energy assets and war-making infrastructure, paralysing them before a kinetic strike. This has shown that digital disruption is an integrated aspect of physical destruction.
The Cognitive Dimension: Cognitive space is the new domain of warfare which controls the global and domestic narratives. This contest for perception illustrates how public opinion, morale, and legitimacy are now operational factors. For India, this is the weak link, as seen during Kargil, Galwan, and to an extent, Operation Sindoor, and it merits major focus. Wars have transitioned to society, and resilience in the information domain is as critical as the physical battlespace.
DOCTRINAL SHIFTS
Hardware alone will not deliver results. Structures and command arrangements must evolve. Multi-domain operations are no longer a theory. Land, air, sea, cyber, space, and the cognitive domain are all part of the same battlespace. Dominance in one domain means little unless it is connected to others. Compressing the decision cycle, linking sensors to shooters, and empowering junior commanders to act in real time are decisive.
The Ukraine conflict highlights the fragility of logistics: depots, fuel, and transport routes are prime targets, demanding mobile nodes, hardened convoys, and redundant supply lines for sustained operations.
India has begun some reforms. Integrated Battle Groups, combat restructuring, and discussions on theatre commands are steps forward. Yet progress has been slow. Services still guard their turf. The Ukraine conflict shows that jointness is not optional. India will need to give priority to functional commands for cyber, space, unmanned systems, air defence and information warfare.
The cognitive space deserves equal weight. Narrative control proved decisive for Ukraine. By shaping international opinion, sustaining morale, and exposing Russian failures, it created a strategic advantage. Russia’s difficulties grew because it could not dominate the information domain. Countering such campaigns requires institutions, trained personnel, and integration of information warfare into national security planning.
RETURN OF THE REAR
The Ukraine conflict has shown how fragile logistics can be. Supply depots, fuel dumps, and transport corridors once thought safe are now prime targets. Precision strikes and drones have made the rear almost as contested as the front. Sustaining operations demands smaller mobile nodes, hardened convoys, and redundant lines of supply.
For India, this is not new. The Kargil conflict showcased the challenges of operational sustenance at altitude. Roads in Ladakh and Arunachal are restrictive and weather-dependent. Airlift capacity, though enhanced, is still limited. If logistics are struck in such terrain, combat units will stall. The lesson from Ukraine is that logistics is no longer a background function. It is at the heart of operational effectiveness. Investment in resilient supply networks, forward stockpiling, and border infrastructure is as vital as investment in combat arms.
ATMANIRBHAR IN DEFENCE
Strategic autonomy will remain hollow without indigenous capacity. Equally important is investment in human capital that can operate in cyber and information domains. Strategic autonomy is not just diplomacy. It is the ability to sustain a war without waiting for external suppliers.
India’s modernisation must focus on integrating systems rather than accumulating platforms. Networks that connect sensors, shooters, and decision makers across domains should be the priority. Artificial intelligence should be embedded into command and control. Training must reflect multi-domain realities rather than single-service battles.
India needs to develop its own indigenous drone ecosystem through a PPP model with both capacity and autonomous capability. India must invest in small satellite constellations, long-endurance drones, and AI-enabled fusion centres to provide commanders with persistent awareness. Redundant communication systems are vital to resist cyber and electronic attack.
India’s priority should not be the hurried creation of theatre commands but the establishment of functional commands that integrate resources across services for specific operational effects. Strength is not in merging theatres, but in dominating the battlespace, and victory belongs to the nation that fuses its battlespace, not just its forces.
India must urgently adapt, building joint, resilient, and networked forces, investing in indigenous production, strengthening logistics, protecting cognitive space, reforming command structures, and embedding adaptability into military culture.
Cognitive warfare requires institutional attention. India must create dedicated structures to monitor hostile narratives, train specialists in counter-propaganda, and link responses with diplomatic and media instruments. Public resilience to disinformation should be developed as part of national security.
Logistics must be restructured to survive precision strikes. Underground fuel and ammunition storage, dispersed supply depots, and mobile maintenance teams are essential. Digital logistics networks linked to ISR will allow dynamic rerouting under attack.
Most importantly, India must foster adaptability. Ukraine showed how innovation at the lowest levels often shifted the balance. India’s armed forces must encourage initiative, allow experimentation, and reduce bureaucratic rigidity. Professional military education must shed its legacy cloak and encourage thought leadership where creativity and constructive criticism are encouraged, and multi-domain capabilities are integrated. Modern conflict will not reward those who wait for orders but those who seize fleeting opportunities within the commander’s intent.
SYMBOLS OF STRENGTH
The war in Ukraine has already redrawn the map of conventional warfare. Heavy platforms, once seen as symbols of strength, have been exposed as vulnerable. Drones and electronic warfare are now central. Information dominance shapes outcomes as much as firepower. Logistics has returned to the front line of strategy.
For India, these lessons are urgent. Adversaries are studying them and adapting quickly. India must build forces that are joint, networked, and resilient. It must invest in indigenous production and protect the cognitive space as fiercely as its physical borders. Logistics must be treated as a combat function. Command structures must evolve to reflect functional domains. Above all, adaptability must be embedded in military culture.
Wars ahead will not be won by mass alone or technology alone. They will be won by those who integrate kill chains with precision mass. India must learn relevant lessons from the Ukraine battlespace and be future-ready.
(Lt Gen A B Shivane (R), Former DG Mechanised Forces, Indian Army. TEDx Speaker, Strategic Defence Consultant, Analyst & Corporate Mentor. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Herald.)
Key Takeaways
- Ukraine war shows agility and innovation outweigh bulk and outdated doctrines.
- Drones, cyber attacks, and electronic warfare dominate modern battlespaces.
- Cognitive warfare and narrative control now shape legitimacy and morale.
- Logistics is the frontline: rear supply lines are vulnerable to precision strikes.
- India must build joint, resilient, and indigenous capabilities across all domains.
