Russia remains a vital defense supplier to Vietnam, just like India. Putin was given the same reception as US President Biden and PRC President Xi Jin Ping, reflecting Vietnam’s “Bamboo Diplomacy”. It showed that Russia is not toeing the PRC’s stand in the South or East China Sea. This allows India a strategic advantage over China, asserting its role in regional stability.
By Ambassador Anil Wadhwa, IFS (Retd) & Former Secretary East, MEA
a 5 mins read.
Global East
In a broader geo political context, and especially since the Ukraine war began in 2022, Russia’s major underlying priority is securing and extending, where possible, its traditional spheres of influence, and taking control of natural and infrastructure resources primarily in Eurasia, but also relying on the Soviet Union’s global legacies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Russia, and increasingly, China, are now using the terminology of a “multipolar world” and “a new world order’ as opposed to the “rules-based international order” of the United States and the West – posing questions like “who’s rules and whose order”?
The countries sanctioned by the West – Russia, Iran, DPRK and China facing technology denial and resistance – have gravitated towards each other in an axis disliked by the US and the West. In the aftermath of Russia’s control over Crimea and the war in Ukraine since 2022, Vladimir Putin has turned the bulk of Russia’s efforts to the Global South and “Global East” – a new notion that has become popular in Russia’s foreign policy lexicon. Crystallising its security alliances in the Middle East and East Asia ostensibly indicates Russia’s escalatory strategy in these regions, helping to distract Western resources from supporting Ukraine.
It naturally leads to increasing tensions and risks of military escalation in North East Asia; inspiring China and DPRK in their anti-American posturing, particularly over Taiwan and South Korea; provoking retaliatory policies by the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other US partners in the region. Russia obviously will want to create conditions that allow it to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine to freeze the conflict around the actual line of demarcation. The recent developments in the US and the possibility of Trump returning as the next US President in November, therefore, is a prospect that Russia would welcome.
Indo Pacific 4
Putin’s recent visits to DPRK and Vietnam in June 2024 stand out as a reflection of a renewed Russian outreach strategy. During Putin’s visit to DPRK, a comprehensive strategic partnership document to elevate bilateral relations and for deeper long-term cooperation between their heavily sanctioned countries was signed. This document covers the political, trade and investment, cultural, humanitarian and security spheres. It is specific in mentioning military and technological cooperation including that in space, biology, and peaceful atomic energy areas. Among the 23 articles of the document was a clause that brought back language from the 1961 Treaty between the Soviet Union and DPRK, including mutual immediate “military and other assistance by all means at its disposal” in case of armed aggression on either of the parties.
Putin and Kim Jong Un had last met in Russia’s Far East in September 2023. South Korean and Western intelligence agencies have concluded that North Korea has supplied munitions to Russian troops in Ukraine and that Russia is providing technical assistance for North Korea’s budding satellite program. Formalising the trends in Russia – North Korea relations seen in recent years has, ironically, added to the momentum and will for the US and South Korea to bolster their ties and trilateral security cooperation with Japan and for Seoul and Tokyo to agree to strengthen ties with NATO and European states – a result of the recent NATO Summit in Washington; which roped in Australia and New Zealand also into the “Indo Pacific 4” grouping.
China’s reaction to the visit was non-committal. Putin had visited China a month before DPRK, which demonstrated Russia’s prioritization of China over any other country in its current diplomatic playbook. China’s monopoly over the DPRK relationship will now be shared with Russia, but China will draw comfort from the fact that Russia DPRK ties bolster the anti–US coalition and further distract the US from the strategic competition with China on top of the Ukraine war and the Middle East Crisis.
The recent Summit between PM Modi and President Putin in July was a strong reiteration of the special and privileged strategic partnership that has survived the test of time. Noteworthy was the focus on transport and connectivity.
Boosting Cooperation
The visit to Vietnam reflects that Russia not only has close ties with Vietnam but also has a stake in the oil exploration in the South China Sea and is making efforts to form its version of a security architecture in Asia–Pacific. It also helps dispel the notion that Russia is a junior partner of China. Vietnam and Russia signed 12 agreements for boosting cooperation in areas including civil nuclear projects, agriculture, tourism, energy and petroleum cooperation, education and disease prevention. Significantly, not all the agreements were made public, indicating that defense and security issues could have been covered in the agreements.
Russia remains a vital defense supplier to Vietnam, just like India. Putin was given the same reception as US President Biden and PRC President Xi Jin Ping, reflecting Vietnam’s “Bamboo Diplomacy”. The visit indicated that Russian ties with Vietnam are of an enduring nature and remain unaffected by Vietnam’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the US, Japan, and South Korea. It showed that Russia is not toeing the PRC’s stand in the South China Sea or East Sea because it favored the Vietnamese approach and is continuing to participate in offshore oil exploration in Vietnam waters that are claimed by the PRC. Vietnam also provides Russia an avenue for diversifying its export of natural gas, which is important as the EU has decided to ban EU ports from reselling Russian LNG after it arrives and has blocked financing for Russia’s Arctic and Baltic LNG terminals.
In the Middle East, last year, Putin paid successful visits to UAE and Saudi Arabia – both close to the United States. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko has let it be known that Russia expects to sign a new agreement on Comprehensive cooperation with Iran in the very near future. This agreement will replace a 2001 pact, extended in 2020; which covers cooperation on security, energy, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the construction of nuclear plants, industry and technology. Since the Ukraine war, both sides have firmed up investment, military, and energy ties.
The recent Summit between PM Modi and President Putin in July was a strong reiteration of the special and privileged strategic partnership that has survived the test of time. Noteworthy was the focus on transport and connectivity, the Russian Far East, the North-South transport corridor, and the Chennai Vladivostok maritime route. A deepened cooperation would allow a stronger Indo-Russian footprint in Eurasia and the Arctic, in the face of increasing Chinese penetration in the region.
Counter-Offensive
These will also be the sites of Indo-Russian cooperation. Russia had also approved a draft logistics agreement with India in June. It will now be finalized shortly and will facilitate logistics support between the two countries during various military operations, including peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and joint military exercises. The support usually involves critical services like refueling, maintenance, and supply provisions, and increases interoperability.
India’s partnership with Russia allows it to counterbalance China’s influence in Eurasia. By working closely with Russia, along with the USA and Japan, India is trying to enhance its position within the Asian security framework. This allows India a strategic advantage over China, asserting its role in regional stability. For President Putin, the Summit meeting with PM Modi helped to challenge the idea of Russia’s global isolation further. Before meeting Modi, Putin engaged with Central Asia Countries at the Shanghai Cooperation organization Summit in Kazakhstan, where he also met Turkish President Erdogan as well as Chinese President Xi Jin Ping. Victor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister, also visited Moscow. These engagements suggest a growing line of international leaders seeking dialogue with Russia; providing a persistent global connectivity.
Trump himself has stated that he “would end the war one day” and also said on that occasion that the US should not be sending money to Ukraine with no strings attached.
Frozen Assets
Meanwhile, by making gradual, creeping advances along the more than 1000 km long front line, Russia is forcing Ukraine to commit to defensive operations rather than gear up for a counter-offensive. The success of any future Ukrainian counter-offensive will depend primarily on how much support it receives from its Western allies. President Zelensky said this week that the current level of support was enough to hold off further Russian advances but not win the war. Mid-June brought more uncertainty on that front when Trump in the United States announced that he had picked JD Vance as his Vice-Presidential nominee.
Vance has previously suggested that Ukraine should negotiate with Russia because the US and other allies do not have the capacity to support it. Trump himself has stated that he “would end the war one day” and also said on that occasion that the US should not be sending money to Ukraine with no strings attached. At the same time, Germany plans to halve its military aid to Ukraine next year – although it suggested that Ukraine should be able to meet the bulk of its military needs with the $ 50 billion in loans from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets approved by the G 7 last month.
If the worst-case scenario for Ukraine were to materialize – if the US stopped providing aid, Europe did not step up its assistance and Ukraine was not able to access the frozen Russian assets – Russia would likely start to make much bigger gains. In these circumstances, Zelensky stuck an unusually subdued tone as he addressed his nation in the third week of July – hinting at a willingness to negotiate with Russia for the first time since the war began more than two years ago. Right now, it is politically difficult, if not impossible, for Zelensky to state that peace can be achieved without the full return of all Ukrainian territories. However, over time, this could become possible.
(Ambassador Anil Wadhwa (R) was Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs and Indian Ambassador to Italy, Thailand, Oman and Poland. He was also an international civil servant with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Journal.)
