By Air Marshal Anil Khosla (R)
a 6 mins read.
Genesis
On the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine voted in favour of independence from the Soviet Union in a referendum. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus set up a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In December 1994, after the end of the Cold War, Ukraine, Russia, the UK, and the US agreed to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders in exchange for Ukraine abandoning the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union. In May 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed a friendship treaty that allowed Russia to retain ownership of most ships in the Black Sea fleet (based in Ukraine’s Crimea) in exchange for Moscow paying Kyiv a modest rent to use the port of Sebastopol. Moscow also remained Kyiv’s most important commercial partner, with Ukraine dependent on Russian oil and gas.
Ukraine, perceiving the CIS as a potential tool for Moscow’s influence, maintained a cautious stance and showed an apparent inclination towards the West, actively seeking ties with the US-led NATO military alliance. In 2005, Ukraine reiterated its desire to join the EU, along with NATO. In 2008, at a summit in Bucharest, NATO leaders agreed that Ukraine had a future in the alliance, sparking Moscow’s ire. In 2014, Russia sent its Special Forces to take control of strategic sites on Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula. In March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty absorbing Crimea into Russia. The annexation provoked a diplomatic crisis between the West and Russia. In April 2014, pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk declared their regions to be independent. The clashes became a full-blown conflict in May 2014.
Perspective: Relevant Aspects of Present Conflict
On 24 February 22, Russia invaded Ukraine, calling it a special military operation. The Russian narrative is that “The US-led West (the USA, NATO and EU) is the aggressor, using Ukraine against it as a pawn, not honouring its commitment and expanding the NATO westwards, bringing it to the Russian doorstep, and compelling Russia into taking this drastic action”. On the other hand, the Western narrative is that “Russia is the aggressor, trying to rebuild its lost empire, with Ukraine being the victim, and the West is supporting the democratic rights of the victim country”.
Russian Objectives. Officially, Russia stated its objectives of the “special military operation” as “demilitarisation, denazification and assurance about the neutral status of Ukraine (i.e., not joining NATO).” This operation, also known as the ‘Russian-Ukrainian War ‘, was justified by Russia citing a call for help from the Donbas region for its liberation from Ukraine. An undeclared objective is also to consolidate the Russian hold on Crimea.
Military Power Comparison. There is a significant disparity between the strength of Russia’s and Ukraine’s defence forces. Russia is the number two military power globally. The Russian Air Force is ranked second, whereas the Ukrainian Air Force is ranked 27th globally. Numerically, the Russian Air Force is about 8 to 10 times the size of the Ukrainian Air Force. The Russian army is 3 to 6 times that of the Ukrainian military compared to the army’s strength and equipment.
Orchestration of Operations. The operations were initiated by Russia with hybrid warfare using disruption (cyber-attacks) and destruction (using surface-to-surface and air-delivered long-range vectors). A fair amount of air superiority was achieved in the initial stages. The surface operations were three-pronged, with attacks from North, East and South. In the North, the advance was towards Kyiv and Kharkiv, intending for regime change at the capital. In the east, advances towards Donbas, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Mariupol were obviously to liberate the Donbas area and create a Russia-friendly corridor. In the south, addressing Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Snake Island was to consolidate hold on Crimea and deny sea access to Ukraine.
Phase I of The War. In this phase, the Russian intention was to take over the capital with swift action and bring in a regime change. Surface forces advanced towards Kyiv on two axes, with the third axis being by the air domain. The Russian Special Forces took over the Hostomel airport (25 Km from Kyiv) to pump in combatants, equipment, and supplies. However, the helicopters and the heavy-lift transport aircraft could not land due to vulnerability from shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, failing the overall plan.
Phase II of the War. A few weeks into the war, the Russian forces reorganised, and concentration shifted from northern to eastern and southern areas. The operations in this phase were like urban guerrilla warfare, with Russian forces surrounding the cities and Ukrainian forces employing defensive, hit-and-run tactics. What stands out in the entire operation is that the Russians did not utilise the full potential of the airpower despite the significant disparity between the forces of the two countries.
Russian Referendum. In late September 2022, Russia held referendums in four areas of Ukraine – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. On 30 September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the takeover of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia in an address to both houses of the Russian parliament. As far as Russia is concerned, this marked the completion of its special operations in Ukraine.
Achievement of Objectives. So far, Russia has been able to create a ‘friendly corridor’ in its eastern region, a term used to describe the areas under Russian control that serve as a buffer zone between Russia and Ukraine. The Russians have considerably reduced the Ukrainian combat potential by destroying most of its military bases and selective defence industry. Russia has also consolidated its hold on Crimea, ending its water and power blockade. In addition, it has stalled the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO for the time being.
Western Aid to Ukraine: Gradually Enhancing its Offensive Capability
Though defence and security links between Ukraine, NATO members and other allies and partners started soon after Ukraine’s independence in 1991, it intensified when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. However, it was limited to training and provision of non-lethal military equipment. Bilateral military assistance has been significantly stepped up after 24 February 2022. In addition to massive funds, the West gave Ukraine lethal weapons like anti-tank missiles and drones to stem Russian ground advances. Much more important were the Air Defence systems that prevented the Russian Air Force from using Ukrainian skies with immunity.
While maintaining the high priority of air defence and the supply of ammunition, the West has gradually enhanced Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Initial aid packages had limited-range howitzers for use at the frontline. Later, the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS—with 77km range rockets) was added to the package. This was a significant boost for the Ukrainian military, allowing it to target Russian forward weapons storage facilities.
After that, a 150 km range Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) was included. It put within reach all of Russia’s supply lines in the east of the country as well as part of Russian-occupied Crimea. Late last year, the US began to supply Ukraine with the older medium-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) armed with wide-spreading cluster munitions that can travel up to 160 Km. Now, the US is leaning toward sending the longer-range version of the missile with a 300 km range.
These weapons, along with drones, provide Ukraine with the capabilities to strike deep farther inside the Russian-held territory. Kyiv has already embarked on a drone attack on oil and energy facilities inside mainland Russia and an attack on a Russian military airfield in Crimea. It also struck the province of Tatarstan earlier, marking Ukraine’s most profound attack inside Russia so far.
Current Phase and the Future Prospects of the War
Overall, the pace of the war has slowed down with periodic fluctuations. Russia is trying to hold onto the so-called liberated territories, while Ukraine is trying counteroffensives. Ukraine cannot sustain the war on its own and needs economic and military aid from the West. However, they cannot accept backtracking now. Acceptance of the loss of Ukrainian territory would be seen as a defeat for the US-led West. Loss of occupied territory back to Ukraine would be considered a defeat for Russia. In this stalemate, there is no honourable exit possibility for either.
The prevailing domestic situation in both countries is an aversion to further loss of human life. The West is encouraging Ukraine to continue and is enhancing its offensive capabilities with stand-off weapons. Russia has also responded to the Ukrainian counter-offensive attacks with punitive strikes using long-range weapons and missiles. This engagement phase with long-range stand-off weapons, drones, and missiles will be long drawn. So far, due consideration has been given to the escalation control. However, a miss calculation by either side could be catastrophic for the involved countries, the region, and the world.
(Air Marshal (R) Anil Khosla, Former Vice Chief, Indian Air Force Researcher & Analyst Distinguished Fellow – USI & CAPS. The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The News Analytics Journal.)
